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AN ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
IN THE PHILIPPINES/ 1986-1988* 
Ledivina v . Carifio** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Aquino government gained power under extraordinary 
circumstances. From the beginning, it nas proclaimed a desire to 
be different from its predecessor-regime. Part of its mandate 
is, as the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization 
(1986) put it, "to systematically de-Marcosify society." Thus, it 
has engaged in a redefinition of the role of government and, as 
regards the bureaucracy, modified its membership, structure, size 
and systems, and procedures and practices. The guidipg 
criteria for these changes are the values of private initiative, 
decentralization of power and responsibility, ethics and 
accountaoility, efficiency Of front-line services, and cost-
effectiveness. 
This assessment of public administration after three years 
of Corazon C. Aquino at the helm of government uses primarily the 
first three criteria, not having enough measures on efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness. Some questions are also raised for which 
current activities do not yet provide clear answers, with the 
contention that a mid-term assessment is a process evaluation, 
not a summative one. Thus, the mere act of asking a question may 
assist the administrator in proceeding to preferred directions. 
*This is Chapter II of a bigger study entitled "An Assess-
ment of the Performance of the Aquino Government in Selected 
Policy Areas, 1986-1988." 
**Visiting Research Fellow, 
opment Studies (PiDS). 
Philippine Institute for Devel-
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The paper is based largely on government reports, working papers 
and published sources as well as discussions with administrators 
and civil servants in public seminars and private conversations. 
IX. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
The government of Corazon Aquino has reaffirmed time and 
again its commitment to free enterprise and people power, both 
implying a reduced role for itself even as it attempts to take 
the positive - and role-expanding - functions of orchestrating 
the rise of the economy from the ruins and the promotion of 
equity and social justice to the people. Tnus, the first question 
that should be raised is: What is the emerging role of 
government in Philippine society? This requires a description 
and analysis of moves to reduce or expand tne scope of 
government. 
A. Tne Restoration of the Legislature 
An enlarged scope has come about with the reinstitation of a 
tripartite system of government and the introduction, 
redefinition or modification of government programs. Under 
Marcos, tne legislature was the Satasang Pambansa, a unicameral 
body composed of "elected" officials representing single-member 
districts and some persons appointed by the President. It passed 
971 batas or laws, because even though it was then known to be a 
rubber stamp, most of its members were politicians who still 
needed to "bring home the bacon" to their constituents (by re-
naming political units, providing for local public works, etc.). 
Few of them had super-local concerns. Thus, it did not produce 
enough for the requirements of the authoritarian president. 
Although Marcos earlier antedated all presidential decrees to 
June 12, 1981 this soon became untenable. Thus, he had to 
legalize his power to issue decrees despite a "functioning 
legislature" tnrough the simple expedient of amending tne 
Constitution. Amendment 6 enabled him to give up all pretense of 
having surrendered legislative power to the Batasan. Tnus, most 
of the major legislation during this period were presidential 
decrees. 
In her first year, Corazon Aquino also wielded total 
legislative power. However, because sne had campaigned with the 
promise of abolishing Amendment 6, she issued her decrees under 
tne name "executive order." After the 1987 Constitution was 
overwhelmingly ratified, a bicameral Philippine Congress was 
inaugurated on July 27, 1987. It has since been the main locus of 
legislative power. 
Theoretically, legislation is a function of all governments. 
Thus, the creation of a separate unit for this purpose - despite 
the increase of the congressional bureaucracy, financing and 
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assets - does not necessarily expand the role of government. In 
the Philippines, however, the installation of the Congress can be 
properly seen as an expansion because it has taken on functions 
that were perfunctorily performed, if at all, under the previous 
regime. For example, legislative investigation has allowed 
government to inquire into various aspects of social and 
political life which, under the authoritarian period, were not 
subject to question and debate. These include, among others, 
issues such as lending and financing schemes, insurgency, and 
human rights. Moreover, the reinstitution of the senatorial 
power of treaty ratification has made foreign policy not only a 
concern of both branches but also an interesting issue among 
various government circles as well as the larger society. 
B, Privatization 
Reduction of the role of government would occur with 
privatization - the withdrawal of government from certain areas 
of the economy and society - and the growth of citizen 
participation - this time, the penetration of nongovernmental 
organizations into areas heretofore regarded as state roles. The 
two are related but not the same. The first is concerned with the 
re-assumption by nongovernment -groups of responsibilities that 
have generally been regarded as tasks af the private business 
sector while the other refers to the encroachment primarily by 
so-called not-for-profit otganizatiorfs into areas assumed to be 
functions where government is expected to take the lead. 
The government has planned to withdraw from.certain areas of 
the economy through the sale or dismantling of public enterprises 
or through the reduction of its exposure in certain corporations 
by selling their stocks to the public. The pace of privatization 
has been slow dufe to: (a) the long process of determining whi.ch 
of th'e government owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) would 
be privatized, regularized, merged, abolished or retained; (b) 
legal problems about their ownership, records of assets and 
liabilities, and the like; (c) administrative problems related to 
pricing, location of assets, the involvement of several 
institutions in the process, etc.; (d) resistance of managers and 
workers to the policy; and (e) problems related to selling 
itself, such as the lack of qualified buyers considering the 
policy of cash payments, unattractiveness of the firms being 
sold, etc. Ocampo <1987) has also sensed presidential reluctance 
to dispose of profitable firms which would tend to be the most 
attractive to private buyers. 
As of June 30^ 1989, accounts numbering 164 have been sold 
in whole or in part. Another 121 GOCCs have been approved for 
privatization. The range of activities they represent is wide 
and manifests the government's desire to reduce its involvement 
in the banking and hotel sectors and to withdraw from the direct 
manufacture bf some intermediate and consumer goods (such as 
precision cutting tools, textiles, etc.). It is also slated to 
privatize key industries such as steel and shipping. 
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What the government has decided to retain is also 
interesting 'for purposes of finding out the government's 
definition of its role. For instance, after, a long debate, the 
Philippine National- Oil Company (PNOC) successfully resisted 
privatization on grounds of being "a key institution in 
maintaining political stability, national security and economic 
growth" (Ocampo 1987: 12). The argument used for national 
security purpose was that if PNOC would go, the commodity "Oil" 
would be completely in the hands of MNCs. The- National Food 
Authority, which was due for regularization, remained a public 
enterprise to retain the flexibility to assist fpod crop 
producers through price support and other means and to ensure the 
availability of staple food at all times. The Philippine 
Institute for Development Studies, NEQA's research arm, and the 
Development Academy of the Philippines have retained their status 
inasmuch as the government presumably recognizes the value of an 
independent but attached think-tank in the former case, and a 
training and consultancy arm in the latter case that both deal 
with specific issues of Philippine development. 
The above examples suggest that the implementation of the 
privatization policy was not simply a turnover of anything termed 
as "public enterprise" to the private sector. This is a. 
refreshing change from earlier discussions of the policy which 
had implied an uncritical view of the private sector means of 
handling affairs and a concomitant condemnation of public 
administration as inherently inefficient without touching on the 
particularities of goals and management record of 'individual 
firms (Ocampo 1987, citing Jaime Ongpin and World Bank papers). 
The debates on what to do with these firms have attempted to 
define what the role of government in the economy and society is. 
However, the lofty aims of economic and social stabilization, 
national hegemony and the availability of institutional 
mechanisms for development acceleration do not seem to be present 
in other decisions concerning privatization. For instance, the 
requirement of cash payments almost certainly disqualifies even 
the wealthiest of the labor unions; indeed, all but the 
wealthiest of Filipinos, even though democratization of ownership 
has been a key rationalization for the policy. Certainly the 
earliest sales have shown the increased involvement of foreign 
investors in the economy. Meanwhile, one is hard put to explain 
why corporations like the Philippine Golf Corporation and the 
Philippine Amusements and Games Corporation (PAGCOR) are 
recommended for retention when they are neither pioneering nor 
vital to national security. In fact, the propriety of government 
being engaged in gambling activities through PAGCOR continues to 
be a controversial issue. 
Even-if one accepts the privatization policy, questions may 
be raised about the way it disregards the personnel of the firms 
to be sold. Proclamation No. 50 was made after due consultations 
with multilateral institutions and the local business sector. 
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However, labor was not consulted at all. Indeed, the Proclamation 
states that employees "in privatized assets have no vested right 
to future employment" because the new owners "will have full and 
absolute discretion to retain or dismiss" them (Briones 1989). 
This does not appear consisteht with a government whose 
presidential candidate promised not to "pamper the private 
sector" and recognized "workers and farmers as co-creators of the 
national wealtn" (Aquino January 6, 1986). 
C. People's Participation? 
The "People Power" Revolution emphasized the role of 
citizens in achieving the goals of government and society. As a 
result, the Aquino administration, more than any of its 
predecessors, has encouraged the involvement of nongovernmental 
organizations and groups in all aspects of the process of 
governance. The 1987 Constitution has included sectoral 
representatives as part of the House of Representatives to 
somewhat act as a counterpoint to regularly-elected Members of 
Congress most of whom come from and represent elite families and 
groups. To date, four persons representing groups such as women, 
the disabled, tne veterans, the elderly, farmers, peasants and 
laborers have been appointed-. The process of choosing these 
representatives, however, lacked transparency, especially if one 
takes note of'the fact that the role of mass organizations in 
these sectors does not seem to be prominent. The Supreme Court 
has recently ruled that such appointments are subject to scrutiny 
by the Commission on Appointments, a process that could assure 
that sectors purported to be represented are aware of and do 
recognize the validity of a person's nomination as "their agent." 
This could enhance the sectoral representation system especially 
if the Commission is careful not to make the proceedings too 
protracted or to give it partisan color. 
Nongovernmental organizations have also taken up the slack 
left by public agencies. For instance, NGOs were given the tasks 
of monitoring the performance of the Community Employment and 
Development Program to complement the work of tne NEDA and the 
Department of Public Works and Highways, the major implementor of 
the program. Some agencies have also encouraged the formation of 
auxiliary organizations as support or facilitative groups. This 
task is not new since "people's participation" in the form of 
organizations created by various departments have been used since 
the time of Ramon Magsaysay as a means of mobilizing the people 
and preparing them to accept and cooperate with government 
initiatives. 
Ironically, it was under Marcos that genuine people's 
organizations were able to make their influence felt, albeit 
often in opposition to regime desires (such as the Chico Dam 
conflict). Nevertheless, some government-mobilized organizations, 
such as those of the National Irrigation Administration, 
flourished as participatory mechanisms for the demands of those 
at the bottom (Korten and Siy 1988). 
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Current examples are the people's economic councils of the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and the peace and order 
councils and the CAFGUs of the Department of National Defense. 
These organizations have generally been formed at the initiative 
of the government agency concerned and tend to be not so much 
channels for popular demands but extensions of the government 
delivery system. At the same time, except, for the CAFGUs, they 
tend to have members from the elite of the area xather than from 
disadvantaged groups, giving rise to frequent complaints of the 
rural and urban poor about the government's inability to listen 
to their needs and their lack of representation despite the 
increase of such participatory and consultative bodies. The CAFGU 
may be different as regards membership, but it is like the others 
in being an instrument to preserve the status quo. 
The June-August 1989 controversy on official development 
assistance and the Philippine Aid Plan raises similar issues. 
The Chairman of the RP-US Business Council was appointed as the 
Chairman of the Consultative Council on the PAP, which will 
negotiate with donor countries on behalf of the Philippines. 
Despite his preeminent position in a premier program of 
government, Villanueva remains a private citizen outside the 
provisions of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Ethical Standards Act). 
PAP plans themselves are reportedly going to be made by a private 
school, the Asian Institute of Management, with a grant from 
CJSAID. NEDA, the government planning agency, was out of the 
picture until the resignation of its Director-General 
precipitated by precisely this issue when CCPAP was transferred 
as a committee (becoming the Committee on Official Development 
Assistance) of the NED'A board. Nevertheless, its Director-General 
sits only as a member and not even as a vice chairman. 
Along with the easier acceptance of NGOs with middle-class-
and-up membership and the disregard of labor's interests in 
privatization moves, this new decision appears to reinforce the 
criticism that private business interest is becoming uncritically 
accepted as equivalent to the public interest, despite the 
contrasting pull of the demands of disadvantaged groups of 
society. 
D. New Areas of Concern 
The government also entered into new areas of concern, some 
as a result of totally new policies and programs, others as an 
expansion of previous commitments or their redefinition. This 
includes the search and return of the wealth allegedly taken by 
Marcos from the nation, the promotion of human rights, 
privatization, and the expansion of social programs such as 
agrarian reform and education. 
The retrieval of the wealth plundered by the previous regime 
was the subject of Executive Order No. 1. The magnitude of the 
alleged corruption loot and the processes devised to bring them 
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back were unprecedented, becoming the full-time task of a full-
blown government agency (the Presidential Commission on Good 
Government) with the assistance, participation, and sometimes the 
competition of others, including the Departments of Foreign 
Affairs and Justice, the Office of Solicitor General and the 
courts, both of the Philippines and other countries. 
To signal increased commitment to ethics and accountability, 
the Constitution retained the Commission on Audit, the 
Sandiganbayan and the Civil Service Commission. It also created 
separate offices for the Special Prosecutor (also known as the 
Tanodbayan) to handle the prosecution of offenses of public 
officials, and for what is officially called the Ombudsman. The 
latter also undertakes prosecutory functions but its new thrust 
is to attend to public assistance and complaints. While still 
largely reactive to requests and issues brought before it, the 
Ombudsman is now authorized to also be pro-active by initiating 
inquiries for the good of the service. 
The promotion 'of human rights is a function ordained by the 
1987 Constitution, as a reaction to the breach of civil liberties 
and other human freedoms of the society endured under the 
dictatorship. (Ironically, human rights groups now charge that 
violations have increased under the present regime.) A 
presidential committee which was organized immediately after the 
takeover became the nucleus of the constitutional body — the 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The President also created 
another committee to deal with the same subject since criticisms 
of the handling of this problem have mounted. A continuing 
controversy is whether or not to include acts perpetrated by 
insurgents within the purview of the governmental bodies. The 
military has advocated inclusion in the interest of fairness 
since atrocities are allegedly done by both sides. However, 
another view points out that to treat the two combatants equally 
would be to raise the status of the New People's Army as a force 
equal to the Armed Forces. While the debate continues, the AFP 
has made its own list of NPA violations and the CHR has accepted 
it. 
Privatization of public enterprises - on one side - reduces 
the scope of government, but the process of turning them over to 
nongovernment entities has occupied the administration. The 
Committee on Privatization sets policies and guidelines, taking 
off from the Presidential Commission on Government 
Reorganization's initial studies on how public enterprises should 
be treated (privatized, regularized, merged with other agencies 
or abolished). Actual disposition rests with the Asset 
Privatization Trust (APT), the Sequestered Assets Disposition 
Authority and; parent GOCCs of subsidiaries scheduled for sale. 
Two social programs have been expanded: agrarian reform and 
education. Agrarian reform has been made comprehensive and now 
covers, besides rice and cornlands, those devoted to 'all other 
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agricultural crops, and livestock and poultry. Efforts to go Out 
of the coverage of agrarian reform through sales of stock to 
workers and other schemes should be carefully studied in that 
they may simply be ways for landlords to subvert the principle of 
land to the tiller. 
At the same time, education has been decreed by the 
Constitution to resume its place as the number one program in the 
government budget; its financial resources have increased 
accordingly (although its share remains smaller than that for 
debt service). The main aspects of expansion are the provision 
of free secondary education (to complement free elementary 
education) and subsidy granted to tertiary level students. 
E. Summary 
From this discussion, it appears that despite pronouncements 
to contract its role, government has in fact expanded in terms of 
functions and agencies in the last three years. Expansion has 
been due mainly to the demands of democratization, ethies and 
accountability and social justice which, though insufficiently 
answered, have been accepted as tasks of the government rather 
than any other sector of society. Some reduction, evidenced by 
more popular participation, has also been in response to the same 
needs. Government participation in the economy has been reduced 
by tjie implementation of privatization. It appears, however, that 
reduction of government's role, whether in the economy or in the 
society, has generally provided for greater participation of 
previously dominant groups, both domestic and international, 
instead of allowing for the greater involvement of the 
underprivileged. This preliminary assessment needs to be further 
studied but it calls attention to the need for government as well 
as popular sectors to be more conscious of the implications of 
government moves to enter into' or leave certain areas in terms of 
their effects on the substance of democratization. 
III. PERSONNEL CHANGES 
The transition from an authoritarian regime to a 
re-democratizing one, coupled with the changed role of govern-
ment, has necessitated a restructuring much broader than that 
undertaken by previous regimes. State institutions were subjected 
to both personnel replacements and reorganization. These are 
interrelated and discussed sequentially in this paper. 
A drastic change of political and administrative officials 
and employees occurred immediately after the Aquino ascension. 
Resignations were put forward, as expected, by cabinet officials, 
political ambassadors, heads of public enterprises and others of 
similar rank who were expected to serve at the pleasure of the 
President. Based on the premise of a revolutionary government, 
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Aquino also disbanded the legislature and asked for the 
resignations of the members of the Supreme Court, the Court of 
Appeals and constitutional bodies, and of all officials of local 
governments. The courts and constitutional bodies were then 
purged of members thought to have abused their power on behalf of 
the former president, Ferdinand Marcos. Their bureaucracies were 
also subjected to reorganization. Local officials were likewise 
summarily dismissed and replaced by officers-in-charge; local 
elections were not conducted until January 1988. 
Guided by a new Constitution, a bicameral legislature 
replacing the ousted Batasang Pambansa convened for the first 
time on July 27, 1987. The size, membership and powers of the 
24-member Senate have followed the status quo before 1972. 
However, the House of Representatives came from 200 districts, up 
from 180 from the Batasan. Aside'from persons elected from 
single-member districts, five others have been named to represent 
various disadvantaged groups, an innovation of the 1987 
Constitution. The House retained the power to initiate financial 
legislation and shares with the Senate the other legislative 
functions. (The Senate has the power to ratify treaties and other 
international agreements.) With the overall Senate staff and 
the personnel of individual members, the Commission on 
Appointments (a bicameral body) and standing committees, the 
Senate bureaucracy stood at 1,684 as of May 31, 1989. Its House 
counterpart is a bureaucracy of 2,508. Thus, the Senate alone 
nad almost as big an organization as the unicameral Batasan which 
had 1,780 personnel. Together, the new Congress accounts for a 
135 percent increase in personnel between the end of the Marcos 
period and 1989. 
A. Changing the Personnel of the Bureaucracy: 
Three Alternatives 
Personnel changes in the bureaucracy were also instituted 
immediately, although their legal underpinning was not issued 
until a month later, embodied in Proclamation No. 3 or the 
"Freedom Constitution" of the Revolutionary Government. That 
document simply stated that all persons not replaced witnin a 
year of its promulgation (or up to March 25, 1987) were deemed to 
have been retained. That innocent-looking provision actually 
removed tenure security from all incumbent officials and 
employees. 
The prospect of a wide-ranging purge was initially welcome. 
Many employees themselves felt that their ranks were dishonored 
by the unabashed electioneering and corruption of the previous 
administration. They were uncomfortable with them even though 
they may have joined them, justifying their behavior as their 
duty to obey superior orders. 
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Unsolicited resignations came from political officials and 
Career Executive Service Officers (CESOs) who ware either so 
identified with Marcos or so sure of Aquino's incapacitation for 
the job that they could not continue to work for her government. 
But in a shrunken economy with little possibility for alternative 
employment, few had the courage of their convictions. After the 
first weeks, it became clear to the new cabinet that they had to 
be aggressive in cleaning up their offices. In doing so> they 
took one of three alternatives: (a) retention of old permanent 
employees, following the practice under regular succession of 
regimes; (D) provision of incentives such as early retirement to 
ease out undesired personnel; and (c) purging of the ranks. 
1. Employee Retention 
The first was exemplified by the Ministry of Social Services 
and Development which reported that it kept all its personnel, 
including casuals 
rather than lay them off and further agg ravate the 
unemployment situation.. . in line with the new 
government1s policy to bui Id a just and huma ne soc iety 
(1986: 5). 
Tne view of officials taking this option was that, with their 
management skills, they could re-orient and utilize the civil 
servants they inherited just as well as new personnel that they 
could hire to replace theiti. 
This option seems to have been the least popular among tne 
new executives (though the most popular among employees) in that 
few agencies actually chose it. Among them were the MSSD, the 
central office of the Ministry of Justice and a few local 
governments. 
2. Early Retirement 
The second provided generous benefits for those who would 
voluntarily leave, thus killing two birds with one stone: 
"trimming the fat" in the organization, which produced a bonus if 
those they specifically wanted to leave got the message; and 
helping in the economic recovery (on the assumption that the big 
pensions would go into productive investments). As the 
Development Bank of the Philippines stated: 
We look at our resignees and retirees as "development 
agents," well-educated, trained and motivated 
individuals, whom DBP is releasing into the economy. 
Most of them have already indicated their intentions to 
put up their own... projects, and do their bit for 
economic recovery (1986: 5). 
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The first Early Retirement Program was a handiwork of Marcos 
in; December 1985 and seemed to have been driven by two factors: 
(a) a means of getting support from faithful employees on the eve 
of the snap elections (only persons with at least twenty years of 
service were qualified); and (b) the start of the move towards 
trimming the bureaucracy, a demand of the WB-IMF even at that 
period. Under Aquino, the.option was originally open only to 
employees of a few public enterprises which could.allocate funds 
for the purpose by resolution of their respective boards. it 
became a government-wide effort with the passage of Rep. Act No. 
6683 (December 2, 1988) or .the Early Retirement Law. 
The Act allowed employees with satisfactory service of not 
less than two years to opt for -early retirement, in exchange for 
lumpsum benefits of one and 1/4 months of pay for every year of 
service. Payment was promised within a month of approval of 
application, and the Department of Budget and Management set 
aside #1,750 M to accommodate an estimated 35,000 early retirees. 
This was about five percent of' the estimated total number of 
personnel eligible under the scheme. It was estimated that even 
with 50 percent replacement, the Early Retirement Program (ERP) 
could generate about f»650 M in savings in 1989 alone and thus was 
a viable fat-trimming mechanism (DBM, November 7, 1988). 
However, the ERP was generally smaller than what the individual 
public enterprises provided. For iristance, DBP had a graduated 
package which gave as much as 175 percent of monthly pay for 
employees with fifteen or more years of service. As such, it was 
clearly targeted to older employees whose projected regular 
retirement after only a few more years would yield them only 100 
percent of monthly pay for every year of service (DBP 1987). 
Unlike other government retirement options under Aquino, .ERP 
beneficiaries were not available for re-employment for five 
years, and they had a limited period in which to file for early 
retirement. The attractiveness of the option was further vitiated 
by two provisions: (a) It disqualified those who had voluntarily 
chosen tp be phased out during their agency's reorganization; and 
(b) The positions of its beneficiaries could not be retained 
unless certified as essential by the Agency Head and filled up 
by persons already within the service whose positions would then 
be the items subject to abolition. The first meant that people 
who made early decisions to leave to allow the new administration 
flexibility - a gracious gesture in a time of turmoil - could 
not get the benefits given to their more recalcitrant colleagues. 
Also, there were complaints that some employees were asked to 
sign waiver letters by their department heads just before the 
promulgation of the law and therefore could not avail of early 
retirement. Also, it effectively removed from coverage many 
persons who suffered the first wave of the purge. The second, 
which specifically tied ERP to fat-trimming, also meant that some 
employees in positions deemed indispensable by management could 
not avail of early retirement, even if they wished to do so, if 
they had no available internal replacements. 
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3. The Purge 
The third option was the most controversial. Seeking to 
change what they considered a tainted bureaucracy, most 
officials sought courtesy resignations from all ranking 
personnel, and removed those who did not pass their evaluation. 
Some did not bother with such niceties. 
At end of 1988, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) released 
a staff study on the rate of employee separation and accession 
between February 25, 1986 and June 30, 1987 (Esleta 1988). 
Attempting to cover the whole bureaucracy, it mustered a 57 
percent retrieval rate from agencies representing 385,439 
employees in February 1986. The respondent-agencies accounted 
for about 30 percent of the total population of 1.3 million 
persons. It may then be surmised that many big agencies have not 
responded. Morever, given the sensitivity of the topic, it might 
be expected that those who undertook the most personnel shake-ups 
had voluntarily excluded themselves. It should also be noted 
that employee separation includes not only dismissals and 
reductions in force, but also retirements, transfers, 
resignations and the like, some of which could manifest regular 
personnel attrition rather than the purge. 
These points being borne in mind, the CSC data show that 
37,885 or 9.82 percent of the February 1986 personnel in the 
agencies surveyed were separated from the service in the first 
fifteen months of the Aquino regime. Of these, 9.31 percent were 
dismissed and another 12.38 percent were victims of 
reorganization (through reduction in force and phasing out); 
together, these categories represented 8,218 people. Some of the 
others could have been purge victims whose separation was couched 
in more polite terms. If the agencies were deemed representative, 
it would appear that the purge affected about 27,500 or 2.12 
percent of personnel. 1/ Still, they constitute a much smaller 
number than the horror figures being thrown at that period (one, 
suggested as a possibility to the Senate Civil Service Committee, 
was as high as a third of the bureaucracy, or about 400,000). 
How could it have wrought so much protest, demoralization and 
confusion? 
First,"this was the biggest set of dismissals yet: although 
Marcos purged employees from 1972 to 1975 (and in trickles 
throughout the rest of Martial Law, a 14-year period) his victims 
were estimated only at around 3,000, certainly not more than 
5,000. 
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Taking the total percentage of those dismissed and phased 
out (21.69%), as a percentage of the total attrition (9.82%) 
gives 2.12 as the percentage purged from the bureaucracy. 
Multiplying it with the best estimate of the size of the civil 
service - 1.3 million - gives 27,560. 
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Second, the axe fell on certain groups: members of the top 
rung of the civil service or CESOs (Career Executive Service 
Officers), local government civil servants, personnel of the 
Ministries of Human Settlements (MHS), Local Government, Public 
Works and Highways, Environment and Natural Resources, Tourism; 
the National Food Authority, the Philippine Tourism Authority, 
other government corporations, to name just a few. As much as 
one-third of CESOs lost their positions; local and national 
personnel rosters changed overnight. The main targets of the 
purge could-be identified by certain agencies or positions, but 
what made them deserve dismissal was not clear. Some agencies, 
like the MHS and a few of the government firms were recommended 
for abolition or privatization even before Marcos' regime ended; 
some, like the MPWH and MENR, were supposed to be snake-pits -
but the rest were not. One also should not judge persons by their 
agencies. But honest and competent people were removed along with 
those rumored to be corrupt and obsequious to their superiors or 
the Marcoses. The agency differential seemed to be partly a 
function of the management background of the agency head. 
Politicians tended to remove large batches of personnel and 
replace them with "trusted newcomers" or political followers. 2/ 
On the other hand, executives from the private sector, 
academics and promoted career officials tended to use the first 
and second options or engage in a rational and open performance 
evaluation. 
Third, the process of choosing who should be removed left 
much to be desired. In some agencies, like the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, a 
painstaking appraisal of the record of the employees was made, 
complete with documents analysis, feedback of supporters, 
subordinates and clients and interviews of the civil servants 
themselves (Alfiler 1987, Alonzo 1987). But in others, 
performance was laid aside in the seatch for political loyalty. 
In one MHS unit, employees were asked wnere they were during the 
People Power Revolution. One informant, who was at EDSA, felt 
her professional record spoke for itself, refused to answer the 
question, and lost her job. There were many others like her. 
In others, any assessment process made was not discerned by 
employees nor was cause for their removal given. In the Office 
of the Prime Minister (takeh over by the Vice President who was 
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Of the eight Cabinet officials who had earlier run for 
public office, only Secretary of Justice Neptali Gonzales, and 
holdover National Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile were 
reported not to have instituted a purge. Gonzales would later 
h e a d . fcl?e E ,°* 1 7 central review committee. Of the non-
politicians, there were no reported large-scale summary 
dismissals except at the Tourism Ministry (although some later 
did remove employees for reorganization purposes). 
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concurrently Prime Minister until the effectivity of the new 
Constitution), employees were given separation notices effective 
after a month, "to enable you to train your replacement." Others 
were given mimeographed termination letters with their names 
hardly legible. 
Fourth, the mere act of requiring people to submit courtesy 
resignations, even though the assessment process was professional 
and fair, was already destabilizing. In the Ministry of Health, 
1,500 were asked for their resignations, but only 60 were 
accepted and ten, demoted. Those negatively affected were then 
only 4.7 percent of ranking personnel and .10 percent of the 
total personnel force. But insecurity went far beyond these 
At an average r — . 
mouths wondering where the next meal was going to come from. 
Fifth, and related to the fourth factor above, the employees 
saw that "trimming the fat" was an empty phrase, since new 
employees were being hired at a rate much faster than the 
separations. The CSC survey showed 78,440 people were newly 
employed by June 1987, representing an increase of 10.5 percent 
from February 1986. More recent data show that fourteen 
deoartments had 553,532 employees in January 1989, representing a 
net increase of 54,231 persons since the first quarter of 1986, 
or a growth rate of 10.86 percent, a slight increase from 
Esleta's data (DBM-CSC 1989). (See Table 1.) This might suggest 
that even more increases might be expected as more agencies 
complete the implementation of their respective reorganization 
programs. 
The CSC survey shows an accession of two persons for every 
separation (Esleta 1988). The bulk of these - 52.51 percent -
were original appointments. Local governments - the most 
political of the government bureaucracies - accounted for 45.40 
percent of the separations and 37.70 percent of the accessions, 
a replacement rate of 1.72 for every employee removed. The 
biggest relative addition, However, was at the third (or 
executive) level: with 243 separated replaced by 1,505, it was a 
ratio of 6.19 new people for every person leaving the service. 
(See Table 2.) 
Sixtn, the purge authorized by Proclamation No. 3 became 
oractically indistinguishable from general reorganization in that 
they were undertaken simultaneously. Many employees felt that 
escaping from one did not render them immune to the other. The 
two actions were perceived to have whipped a double whammy on the 
governmental institution — the bureaucracy — that was the 
most uncared for and least powerful under the old regime. This 
sense of demoralization increased as the evaluation criteria 
and the process of both purging and reorganization remained vague 
and largely nontransparent. Both gave a sense of uncertainty and 
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Table 1 
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IN FOURTEEN DEPARTMENTS, 
FIRST QUARTER 1986 AND JANUARY 1989 
DEPARTMENT 
Is t 
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL 
Quarter'86 January*89 
% INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
% INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
1. Agrarian Reform 8633 14547 5909 68.40 
2. Environment and 
Natural Resources 23251 24817 1566 6.73 
3. Public Works 
and Highways 3540 2716 (824) (23.27) a/ 
4. Tour ism 942 793 (149) (15.81) 
5. Transportation and 
Communications 27257 30757 3500 12.84 
6. Education, Culture 
and Sports 342043 368234 26191 7.65 
7. Social Welfare 
and Development 5486 6980 1494 27.23 
8. Finance 17437 20075 2638 15.12 
9. Foreign Affairs 1922 1741 (181) (9.41) 
10 .Budget and Management 1800 3584 1784 99.11 
11 .Local Government 6118 5849 (269) (4.39) 
12 .Health 57324 b/ 67876 10552 18.40 
13 .Trade and Industry 1314 b/ 3117 1803 137.21 
14 .Labor and Employment 
TOTAL 
2229 b/ 
499301 
2446 
553532 
217 
54231 
9.73 
10.85 
Notes: a/ Central office only. 
b/ As of December 1985. 
Sources: 1st Quarter: Personnel offices of each department, 1987. 
January 1989: DBM, January 1989. 
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to the personnel and the bureaucracy as a whole. Employees 
spread fear as they awaited results of the assessment, which 
sometimes took months. By then, those who felt they had a 
greater chance in another agency had applied there, creating the 
spectacle of employees under threat in one agency getting jobs 
in a second agency, while tne people in that second agency won 
refuge in a third, which in turn eventually got a new position 
in the first agency. Meanwhilef those still waiting hardly 
did any work, lest they make a mistake and invite the axe on 
themselves, a general reaction pointed out by no less than the 
new Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (Sto. Tomas 1988). 
Seventh, the purge galvanized employees to organize. There 
were two reasons for this: (a) people were removed in such big 
groups that reinforced anger overcame the shame; and (b) the 
civil servants believed the government's claim of "democracy" 
and thought they could get justice if they howled. 
B* Review under the Freedom Constitution 
Proclamation No. 3 only provided a legal basis for 
personnel actions, the revolutionary fervor having immediately 
assumed legitimacy for a purge. However, protests were so 
strong that on May 28,, 1986, the Aquino government felt the need 
to limit, the grounds for removal to the following: 
1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to 
Section 40 of the Civil Service Law (Marcos' grounds, allowed 
when an existing charge against the employee has strong 
evidence, or when s/he is a recidivist or "notoriously 
undesirable"). 
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the 
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the 
Ministry Head concerned; 
3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions; 
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes; 
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent 
is unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement 
is in the interest of the service (Executive Order No. 17, Sec. 
3, May 28, 1986). 
E.O. 17 was well-meaning but the grounds it provided were 
so broad that they could encompass even seemingly innocent acts. 
Moreover, the fact that most removals were couched in tne form 
of acceptance of courtesy resignations made it technically 
impossible for many employees to file appeals. Also, in spite 
of the "removal for cause" principle it espoused, civil servants 
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continued to be dismissed without specifying the grounds for 
that action. 3/ 
A central review committee undertook a thorough and fair 
appeals procedure. It required employees to file sworn 
statements and asked their superiors to explain their side. 
However, heads did not reply within a reasonable period, or not 
at all. The delay was borne by the employees who forfeited 
their salaries during the period of appeal, even if they won the 
case. 
Only 732 petitions had been received by the review 
committee as of March 18, 1987 (Department of Justice 1987). A 
lawyer in the committee did not think that such implied that the 
rest were for just cause. Rather, she pointed out various 
difficulties: the vagueness of the dismissal order (which made 
it difficult for the civil servant to counter the argument); the 
lack of lawyers to draw up the sworn statement; tne lack of 
faith that they would be redressed; the lack of knowledge of 
the review process (which was different from the usual civil 
service channels); its centralized nature; and the fear that 
complaints would make the employees lose all benefits. 
Most of the appeals were not given due course due to 
various technicalities. Of the 177 which were resolved, 122 
appeals (68.93%), covering 207 petitioners, were decided in the 
employees' favor. However, the committee did not have the power 
to compel their superiors to reinstate them so that not all 
employees yot their positions back. The victory turned out to be 
a moral, but ultimately empty, one. 
C. The New Officials and Employees 
There are no data as yet to show how the new bureaucracy 
differs from the old in terms of composition. However, an 
attempt will be made in this section to give preliminary 
characterizations based on published information on personnel. 
1. The Cabinet 
The Aquino and Marcos Cabinets differ from each other. 
Marcos, at the end of his term, had a Cabinet of technocrats 
which he had, in turn, transformed into politicians by having 
most of them run for the Batasan. Except for the Minister of 
Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, and the Minister of Local 
Government, former Governor Jose Rono, none of them had run for 
public office before their Cabinet appointments. Many were 
American-trained, some had been in academe and most had been in 
the private sector. Only two have been career bureaucrats. 
3 / • „ 
For instance, employees from one agency were given 
letters terminating their employment "for analogous reasons." 
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By contrast, the first Aquino Cabinet was dominated by well-
known oppositionists, a lot of whom were pre-martial law 
politicians. The nonpoliticians were prominent members of cause-
oriented groups like MABINI, NAMFREL and other NGOs. Perhaps the 
only one who was not identified with the Opposition (because 
she was closeted in academe as president of an exclusive girls' 
college) was Lourdes Quisumbing, who was appointed to the biggest 
agency, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. 
At the end of 1988, however, the Cabinet was very different. 
All the politicians of the original Cabinet except one - Local 
Government Secretary Jaime Ferrer, who was assassinated in 
December 1987 - had resigned to run for public office. Enrile had 
been fired in October 1986,' along with three others, one 
supposedly for leftist views, the other two for unexplained 
reasons. A Cabinet revamp followed the resignation of vice 
President Salvador Laurel as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, during 
which Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo and Finance Secretary 
Jaime Ongpin were both removed. Except for the departure of 
candidates for both houses of Congress and the replacement of 
retired General Rafael Ileto (Enrile's successor at the Depart-
ment of Defense), the changes seemed a way to assert power over 
or mollify military factions, being in some way a balancing of 
so-called "leftist" and "rightist" elements. 
As of mid-1989, only three of the original Cabinet has 
remained, all of them nonpoliticians. Despite the big number of 
persons replaced, there were few new faces in the political arena 
since the new secretaries were undersecretaries or they were in 
other sectors of government before their appointment to the 
Cabinet. As a result of the balancing, the Cabinet has indeed 
become "centrist," or perhaps more accurately, right-of-center, 
since conservatives such as Fidel Ramos and Jose Concepcion are 
more to the right than Jesuit-trained A.R.A. Bengzon and Raul 
Manglapus will ever be to the left. The 1988 Cabinet has two 
politicians, each vacating his seat in the Senate and the House 
when he was named by the President to Foreign Affairs and Local 
Government Departments, respectively. Three are technocrats who 
held prominent — but not policymaking — positions during the 
Marcos regime (Executive Secretary Macaraig, Cabinet Secretary 
Jose P. de Jesus, and Public Works Secretary Fiorello Estuar). 
Perhaps the other characteristic that recalls the Marcosian 
period is the appearance of relative unity. The 1986-87 Cabinets 
were marked by disagreements that were reported conspicuously in 
the press. The current one has a strain towards speaking with 
one voice - and seldom breaks out from the majority (except in 
the celebrated case of the resignation of NEDA Director-General 
Solita Monsod who, however, kept her peace until a month after 
she left office) . Another characteristic reminiscent of the 
Marcos Cabinet is that some Cabinet officials sought briefings on 
the Letter of Intent from experts from academe who were largely 
opposed to its conditionalities. (However, a Malacanang request 
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soon came for the Cabinet officials to propagate the LOI in their 
respective offices; hence, the caucuses quickly ceased.) 
The frequent Cabinet changes disturbed the operations of 
government. A career bureaucrat has, in fact, quipped tnat after 
2 1/2 years, his job in the Aquino government still remains to be 
"briefing lang ng briefing," as each new Secretary (that 
Department has the record of five changes) brings in his own 
ideas and own team. Some form of reorganization also ensues again 
and the organization has to adjust all over again. Programs 
about to take off have to be re-conceptualized, and tne mission 
and the vision" of the agency have to be restated so frequently 
that it makes the speaker want to vomit (as an Undersecretary has 
put it) and confuses both the implementors and the public. 
2. The Issue of Volunteers 
The new government was so enthusiastically received that 
many concerned citizens actually volunteered their services in 
the early days of the transition. Unfortunately, many who were 
more concerned with personal matters also did so. Struck by the 
euphoria of victory, overwhelmed by the size of the job and 
generally sincere about their revolutionary fervor, the new 
leaders did not question the motives of those who offered their 
services. 
Some proved worthy. Former Executive Secretary Arroyo 
narrated how two ladies volunteered to help him (literally) clean 
up Malacafiang on February 27, 1986, the day after the 
Revolution's triumph. They sorted out and filed records, brought 
important things to his attention, and generally helped him get 
settled in his new task. They turned out to be career civil 
servants rather t h a n p u r e passers-by; thereby helping the new 
government see and realize that the old Civil Service was not all 
that bad (Arroyo 1987). Many PCGG volunteers were also of this 
mold, as they delivered pieces of evidence and information to the 
Commission, helped safeguard public property and pinpoint 
Marcosian estates. Some of these volunteers came from cause-
oriented groups and they continued to be concerned about Public 
affairs after the Revolution, this time on the side of the 
government rather than the Opposition. For instance, Operasyon 
Walang Lagav attempted to help various agencies in value 
formation programs, and to process streamlining and anti-
corruption drives. However, they had to give up the work as it 
became more demanding of their time and resources. 
There were, however, many representatives of the other kinds 
of volunteers. One type may be termed as job-seeker who invests 
his personal time in the hope that he would be considered for 
vacancies that may later arise in the office. Some of these who 
had high qualifications did end up at CESO-level or consultant 
positions. PCGG actually institutionalized this kind ot 
"volunteers" by paying a monthly allowance of f»3,000, an amount 
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that is higher than the regular salaries of public school 
teachers. Their "plight"-reached prominence in the press in 
Christmas 1988 when they demanded the same level of bonuses as 
regular employees (which amount -was tied to their monthly 
salary). 
A second type would be the influence peddler who, by 
rendering pro-bono service, endears himself to the boss. He may 
then exact payment in the form of contracts to a firm he favors, 
perhaps getting appreciation gifts from both sides. . 
A third is the type who would profit directly from the 
volunteer position, especially if it is in a regulatory agency,, 
in the same way that an unscrupulous employee would augment his 
income illegitimately. This one would be more dangerous, 
nowever, in that he is beyond the £>ale of accountability since 
many agencies did not even keep complete rosters of its 
volunteers. 
It is to protect the state and the public, against these 
volunteers that RA 6713 put-them under the purview of its 
provisions, except for the divestment clause. 
3. Demilitarization of the Service? 
The military and civilian bureaucracies had generally been 
kept separate in the Pnilippine context, except in cases like the 
Department of National Defense which assigned some of its 
personnel as "bodyguards" of prominent office-holders, especially 
elected officials. Except during the Magsaysay period, few 
military officials joined the bureaucracy or the political 
leadership after retirement, let alone hold civilian positions 
while on active service, during the pre-Marcos regime. 
Marcos changed all that. Many officers in active or retired 
status joined the civilian part of the service during Martial Law 
to provide their non-uniformed counterparts with examples of 
"professionalism." ; Ironically., though, the authoritarian 
government succeeded in making the military prominent in civilian 
programs through the images of soldiers breaking up strikes, 
demolishing squatter homes, threatening civilians, etc. In 
short, the image was that of short-circuiting the political 
process of consultations and negotiations through the 
blandishment and use of raw force. 
The Aquino government was expected to put an end to military 
involvement in the civilian side of governance. However, the use 
of soldiers, in lieu of dialogue, in the peasants' march in 
Mendiola in January 1987 and in the students' protest rallies in 
early 1989 shows that their usefulness as an armed force in 
civilian programs has not completely stopped. Meanwhile, 
recently-retired military officials have been appointed to 
prominent positions in the bureaucracy. The most famous is Fidel 
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Ramos, who was Chief of -Staff until he retired and then became a 
civilian Secretary of Defense the day after. Many of his 
"civilian" staff are retired officers like him. The current 
National Security Adviser is also a retired military man. 
Perhaps these positions, more than any of the others, require a 
civilian perspective to be able to implement the 
constitutionally-declared principle of civilian supremacy over 
the military (Article II, Sec. 2). Otherwise, the President is 
given tne supposedly civilian perspective over defense and 
security matters by persons whose lifework has been related to 
war. Who will then advocate the political and diplomatic options? 
Aside from these, and with the regular retirement of 
officers of age each year, there will be more military men in 
their prime who will be available for positions in government. 
Already, they head the* post office., the bureau of customs and 
some public enterprises, as did other military officials in 
Marcos' time. However, the most important difference between his 
time and Aquino's is the recall of security officers (known as 
resident military spies in those days) from the di-fferent 
agencies of the bureaucracy. 
The relationship between the political leadership, the 
military and the civil service may also be tackled at this point. 
Aquino's stirring "welcome home, my soldiers," in the April 1986 
speech to the graduates of the Philippine Military Academy 
proclaimed the military role in a democratic government as under 
civilian authority. That'did not stifle some officers' desirm to 
be at center-stage. In the first eighteen months of her rule, 
they attempted several coups. This pressure, and other more 
covert ones, resulted in political leaders leaning over 
-backwards to accommodate their main enemy when they were still 
"The Opposition." The swift passage of the law increasing 
soldiers' pay, the retirement of all officers as soon as they 
are of age, 4/ the elevation of Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos to the 
civilian position of Secretary of National Defense - all bespeak 
a reluctance to stir up military anger and a desire to 
consolidate President Aquino's initially feeble hold on the armed 
forces. 
Meanwhile, the absence of prosecution of human rights 
violations under the Marcos and Aquino regimes, despite the 
creation of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights and its 
later establishment as an independent constitutional body, the 
aggressive policy against Communist rebels in the countryside and 
This allows for mobility for junior officers, a cause of 
dissatisfaction under the old dispensation. 
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the endorsement of citizens' vigilante groups 5/, seem to suggest 
that it was not the soldiers who came home, but Cory Aquino who 
came around to the thinking of the military. 
The bureaucracy has received no similar kid-glove treatment. 
The reasons for the contrast are not hard to find. First, the 
military has arms and the decisive capacity for toppling the 
government. Meanwhile, the power" of the bureaucracy has lain in 
its capacity to stall decisions rather than to make them. 
Second, the military is relatively more irreplaceable than 
the civil service, particularly since Aquino rose to power on a 
revolution of unarmed cause-oriented groups, hardly an 
alternative liberation army. They are, however, possible 
substitutes to civil servants; many of them, in fact, did join 
government and accomplished the yurg'e or benefited from it. 
What exacerbates the feeling of injustice among civil 
servants is that Marcos, during his time, had intervened in the 
recruitment and promotion of military officials more than in the 
civil service which he left largely to the discretion of his 
proven loyal ministers. Many then felt that they should deserve 
the purge only after the military has itself been similarly 
cleansed.- But the brass have taken care of their own and 
recommended lenient punishments even for soldiers involved in 
coup attempts. 
D. The Salary Structure 
When the Aquino government was installed, salaries were 
inadequate on several counts. Generally low, they did not follow 
the principle of equal pay for equal work. The ministry's hiring 
rate for the first level was £6,562 per annum while their heads 
received #91,512, a ratio of 1:14. (Taking into account the cost 
of living allowances of the rank and file, the ratio would 
improve to 1:9.) The gap becomes worse if one considers that the 
ratio ignores the hidden allowances and perquisites of top 
offi cials. The pay differential between the regular civil 
service and public enterprises was also large. 
The Aquino government declared the salaries "abysmal" and 
showed concern towards changing them. However, it had inherited 
a tottering economy where, as of 1988, about 40 percent of the 
government budget had to be allocated to debt service. Besides, 
it deemed the bureaucracy gigantic and saw "trimming the fat" as 
5/ 
Human rights advocates denounce these groups as military 
informants and isurrogates who perpetuate torture and other 
violations of human rights; the military defend them as people-
power against Communists., using a favorite term of post 
revolutionary Philippines.. 
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a necessary prelude to increasing wages. With its hands so tied, 
it put the purges and reorganization ahead of the wage agenda, 
thus dangling a very: strong stick with7hardly a carrot in sight. . 
The Aquino timetable was upset by several factors. First, 
Marcos had announced wage increases on the eve of the snap 
presidential elections. This smacked of blatant electioneering, 
but civil servants welcomed it not as a means of gaining their 
loyalty but as a long overdue reward (CPA Neutrality Seminar, 
February 1986). However, it was implemented for only a few 
agencies and thus there were increases that were pending at the 
time of the regime turnover. Employees in these agencies pressed 
for these increases especially because with the threat of removal 
on their heads, it was better to be resigned or retired on a 
higher salary since benefits are computed _on the basis- of the 
last regular pay. 
Thus, in July 1986, Executive Order No. 31 increased rank 
and file salaries. The lowest monthly hiring rate was moved from 
£546 to #603 and the cost of living allowance (COLA) from_-£300 to 
P450. Together, this represented a 25 percent increase. 
Second, the Constitutional Commission, appalled by the low 
official wages of the highest officials in the land, had 
increased in its transitory provisions their respective salaries 
"until the Congress provides otherwise" (1987 Constitution, 
Article XVII, Sec. 17). The figures provided for were over 100 
percent of official Marcos-period salaries. It also required that 
"at the earliest possible time, the Government shall increase the 
salary scales of the other officials and employees of the 
National Government" (Sec. 18).. 
Accordingly, in March 1987, within a month of Ratification, 
the government started to pay out the new salaries for the 
incumbents of the named positions. Simultaneously, it also 
increased, by smaller though still hefty percentages (mean: 
108%) , the compensation of all positions at the Cabinet and 
Career Executive Service level (E.O. No. 152, March 1987). (See 
Table 3.) 
Meanwhile, it decreed smaller increases for all other 
employees (E.O. 153, March 1987). The civil - servant at the 
bottom moved from i»603 to P693, with no increase of COLA, 
representing an 8.5 percentage change. Another increase was given 
by Republic Act No. 6642 (January 1988), which increased our 
lowly personnel's salary to #762, and the COLA to P700, the whole 
package creating another 30 percent rise. 
In August 1989, salary standardization was supposed to be 
accomplished by the passage of Republic Act No. 6758. The lowest 
salary now incorporates the COLA and amounts to £2,000. At this 
point, the most junior civil servant person has now received a 
total increment of 136 percent since Cory Aquino's rise to power, 
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Table 3 
CHANGES IN MONTHLY SALARIES 
(1985, 1987 and 1989) 
i In £) 
A. CABINET AND CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE OFFICERS* 
POSITION EO 1000 EO 152 % RA 6758 % Cumulative 
(l/'85) (3/'87) Increase (8/'89) Increase Increases 
(in %) 
Secretary 7,626 17,000 123 19,550 15.0 156 
Undersec. 6,904 15,000 117 18,975 26.5 175 
Asst. Sec. 6,596 12,000 82 17,075 42.3 159 
Line Bureau 
Director 6,250 12,000 92 17,075 42.3 173 
Dept. Regional 
Director 5,947 11,000 85 15,180 38.0 155 
Line Bureau 
Asst. Dir. 5,383 11,000 1-04 15,180 38.0 182 
Dept. Asst. 
Reg. Dir. 5,122 10,000 95 13,915 39.2 172 
Line Bureau 
Reg. Dir. 4,637 10,000 115 12,654 26.5 173 
Dept. Service 
Chief 4,412 10,000 126 12,654 26.5 186 
Line Bu. Asst. 
Reg. Dir. 3,800 9,000 137 11,385 26.5 200 
MEAN 108 32.0 173 
B. LOWEST HIRING RATE PER MONTH, 1985 TO 1989 
BASIC COLA TOTAL % INCREASE 
JANUARY 1985 546 300 846 
JULY 1986 (EO No. 31) 603 450 1,053 24.5 MARCH 1987 (EO No. 153) 693 450 1,143 8.4 
JANUARY 1988 (RA 6642) 762 700 1,462 27.9 
AUGUST 1989 (RA 6758) 2,000 ~ — ~ 2,000 36.8 
Cumulative increases between Jan. '85 to Aug. '89 1,154 136.4 
*Excludes representation and transportation allowances. 
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versus 155 percent increase of salary (excluding allowances and 
other benefits, such as service car and representation) for a 
department regional director (who got the lowest increase among 
the CESOs). The mean increase for executive-level positions is 
173 percent. 
These disproportionate changes were made on the ground that 
it cannot afford to give everyone the same increases as those in 
the top positions. While a little arithmetic will show that the 
differential sizes of these increases in peso terms are indeed 
large, it also meant that the regime had put the welfare of those 
already far above the poverty line first over the thousands of 
its extremely underpaid civil servants. Moreover, it is no secret 
that the executives were receiving other benefits - in cash and 
in kind - that were not incorporated in these computations while 
all income changes of lower-level employees were not only open, 
but were directly subject to tax. 
The regime's other justification - that it must attract the 
best into the public service - fueled the already heavy 
resentment against the newcomers from the private sector and the 
holdover CESOs. These persons were specifically mentioned by 
those who felt victimized by the previous regime and who now find 
that those who did not pay their dues during that period are the 
first to reap dividends under the new dispensation. 
A third factor was the swift passage of increases of wages 
and benefits to the military, following the failed coup of 
Gregorio Honasan and his well-publicized alibi that it was not a 
try to oust the government but only a move to dramatize the poor 
conditions of the soldier. The joint executive-legislative rush 
in behalf of the military drew this sharp retort from WAQES: 6/ 
We do not begrudge the fact that soldiers are indeed 
underpaid. But we, the more numerous civilian 
component of the civil service, are just as underpaid 
and demoralized. Do we have to do a Honasan-act to get 
as much attention? (WAGES„ undated, c. September 1987.J 
Other moves had favored certain groups over others. Perhaps 
ttie least controversial was those given to public school teachers 
who had traditionally been the lowliest of civil servants. They 
had won an additional twenty percent increase only after they 
registered massive mass leaves in 1986 and 1987. Medical 
professionals whose Alliance of Health Workers have engaged in a 
similar mass leave also got the ear of the4Department of Health 
V 
WAGES or Wage Adjustment for Government Employees 
Solidarity is a federation of five organizations of civil 
servants, all in turn a conglomeration of smaller employee 
organizations. 
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when a lamp sum for a "career progression scheme for medical 
officers," a thinly disguised program for raising physician 
salaries,, was included in the Department's 1987 and 1988 budgets. 
About 20 other groups or agencies,have received increases without 
mass protests, courtesy of influential heads or sympathizers in 
Malacafiang. Unfortunately, unlike teachers and physicians, these 
do not represent popular causes and have become, like the 
soldiers, bones of contention among civil servants themselves. 
Thus on the issue of wage increases for the civil service, 
the Aquino government, even as it gave in to some demands, has 
not endeared itself to the bureaucracy. Salaries remain low, 
particularly at lower levels; the hiring rate is still lower than 
its own poverty l,ine (#2,400 a month in 1986). Equity also 
remains a problem: the rank and file vis-a-vis CESOs and 
constitutional officers, the military versus the civilian, 
specific occupational groups against each other. Faced with 
pressures from employee organizations and also from its own 
executives who must manage demoralized employees, it has 
threatened protesting employees with grave reprisals while 
further increasing the gap between the top and the rank and file, 
not only in terms of salary differentials but of psychological 
concern as well. The rank and file, which after all is now 
"new," being the result of the purges and additions presided over 
by the leadership, still seems to "be regarded not as part of this 
government but as an unpleasant relic of the Marcos years. 
E. Public Sector Unionism 
A striking feature of the last three years is the rise of 
employee organizations, which have been nothing more than social 
clubs through most of, the Martial Law years, when the right to 
collective bargaining and striking was removed from unions of 
public enterprises performing proprietary functions. The most 
vocal, and among the first of these, were associations of public 
school teachers and government health workers who practically 
invented the method of "mass leaves" in the 1980s to get around 
the strike ban while voicing in the strongest terms possible, 
their demand for higher wages. 
The uncertainty and demoralization caused by the 1986 purges 
ignited organizational fervor in many agencies, buoyed up by the 
belief that a redemocratizing government would listen to their 
demands. In some instances, for example in the Department of 
Trade and Industry, they were heard, and initial reorganization 
plans were revised and employee's representatives given a voice 
in them. 
The Constitution of 1987 had three pertinent provisions on 
public sector unionism. It declared that the right of the people 
in the public and private sectors to form unions shall not be 
abridged (Art. Ill, Sec. 8) and upheld "the rignts of all 
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and 
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negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the 
right to strike in accordance with law" (Art. XIII, Sec. 3). 
However, the third in affirming that "the right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. 
IX, on Civil Service Commission, Sec. 2(5)], seemed to withhold 
the other rights from civil servants, an interpretation that 
seems to be sustained by a reading of Commission proceedings and 
an Auyust 1989 Supreme Court decision. 7/ The Civil Service 
Commission drafted in May 1988 a new cTvil Service Code which 
gives employee organizations broader powers, including, for those 
in certain agencies, the right to strike. However, it has not 
yet been passed by Congress. 
Despite the unclear legal sanction, and because of the 
removals, low wages and their lack of involvement in decisions on 
these, employees have continued to organize and to dramatize 
their demands through various forms of work stoppage. 
In addition to the goal of better working conditions, 
employee associations have also started to flex their musc-les in 
less self-regarding interests. In the National Power Corporation 
(NAPOCOR), they succeeded in stopping the purchase of luxury cars 
by management. The chief executive officer acknowledged tne need 
to be sensitiye to public outcry in the decision to bow to the 
organization's protest, even though no corruption has taken place 
and President Aquino herself had given the NAPOCOR the go-ahead. 
In the National Irrigation Administration and the National 
Housing Authority, the associations have unearthed and documented 
questionable purchases that seem to be directly related to the 
replacement of their respective executives. These exposures and 
protests have occurred not without considerable risk of harass-
ment and sanctions on the part of the lowly employees. Their 
commitment to ethical standards of behavior and their insistence 
for management to uphold them snow a social responsibility that 
as late as May 1988, in a round table meeting on "Bureaucracy and 
Public Accountability," two nationwide organizations of civil 
servants had said they were not ready for. They then felt that 
the gut issues of wages and working conditions had to be served 
first before public sector unio'ns are to be expected to sacrifice 
for the public interest (PSSC 1988). Even as they spoke, the 
fact that agency organizations were already involved in the 
letter speaks of a maturity which one did not expect to find in a 
civil service system that is placed in such a tumtilt as the 1986-
89 bureaucracy. 
However, Bias Ople, a constitutional commissioner and 
Marcos's Minister of Labor has a more pro-worker view of the 
constitutional provisions. See Daily Globe, August 16, 1989. 
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Some employee organizations w i n doubtless be used to fight 
against reform-minded executives who invade the turf of their 
corruption syndicates. Nevertheless, the courage already shown 
by at least three unions bolsters the belief that people power 
need not stay outside the doors of the public apparatus itself. 
In the organization, numbers and dedication of the masses, in the 
public as in the private sector, lie the possibility of a 
thoroughgoing societal reform. 
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
Administrative reorganization can be described in terms of 
its process and results. Decentralization also constitutes a 
major process and structural change in the current political and 
administrative structure. This is discussed in a later section. 
A. The Reorganization Process 
The process of general reorganization of the bureaucracy 
under the Aquino administration can be characterized as 
protracted and confused. The NEDA Philippine Development Report 
Update (1987) itself has pointed to its flaws and general 
unpopularity. Initially, the Presidential Commission on 
Government Reorganization (PCGR) had thought that the process 
would be completed in 100 days. However, despite the few plans 
formalized by reorganization executive orders (REOs) in 1986, and 
the 40 (out of 101 total) REOs issued five days before the 
opening of Congress on July 27, 1987 (which re-assumed the power 
of reorganization at that point) 8/, many of the new position 
structures and staffing patterns of some reorganized agencies 
have not been finalized even as late as June 1989. 
The confusion was caused by the number of groups that 
undertook reorganization for each agency, the lack of guidelines 
and criteria, the confounding interaction of reorganization with 
the purge process, and the rescinding of a few orders. 
Initially, the PCGR created task forces to handle reorganization 
at the agency level. However, individual agencies also made 
their own independent plans which then competed with the PCGR's; 
at the Office of the President. Since the PCGR disbanded at the 
end of 1986, it was not able to shepherd the legislation process. 
Thus, most of the plans formalized by a reorganization executive 
order (REO) were probably the ones prepared internally by the 
agency or represented a compromise between the PCGR's and theirs. 
In some agencies, there were third or fourth: plans, resulting 
from protests of employees, a change of agency head, or both. 
£/ 
See Appendix 1 for a list of_ reorganization executive 
orders. 
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Reorganization is a major tool in reforming an adminis-
trative system towards a government's vision of its goals and 
directions. A study of the Aquino reorganization process, 
however, does not convince one of the presence of a rational mind 
and. a guiding, hand behind it. The PCGR. could have provided; that 
orchestration; however, it not only disbanded early: but also did 
not get;cabinet imprimatur of its guiding principles until August 
13, 1986 or a few weeks after it originally thought it would 
close shop (Iglesias 1988). Moreover, it did not follow its 
proclaimed participatory inclinations for decisionmaking, as it 
virtually ignored the employees and had very -formal public 
consultations in Manila, one three-hour session per agency, 
attended largely by urban middle-class organizations, and not the 
urban and rural poor who should constitute the target of 
government services. 
Guidelines for the conduct of reorganization came on an ad 
hoc basis, suggesting not the unfolding of a plan but reactions 
to public outcry. The first came from the Civil Service 
Commission on September 2, 1986, concerning those who should be 
represented in the reorganization and placement committees. The 
President issued her first Guidelines for a humane and just 
process only on October 2, 1987, after her deadline for the 
approval of the new position structure and staffing pattern to 
implement reorganization had virtually passed unnoticed, 9/ 
Congress decided to act in view of the number of complaints and 
protests of employees. The Senate passed two resolutions 
(October 9, 1987 and March 1, 1988) requesting the President to 
suspend the implementation of. reorganization plans.. These were 
not heeded, although there was an effective postponement of 
implementation following both Senate initiatives,. Both Houses 
then passed Rep. Act No. 6656 providing guidelines- for the 
implementation of reorganization and protecting the security of 
tenure of civil servants (approved June 10, 1988). 
Backtracking on decisions was not rare. Twenty REOs were 
amendments or suspensions of earlier orders. The reorganization 
order for the Civil Service Commission (CSC), supposedly an 
independent body, was rescinded within seven days, with the 
Department of Budget-and Management successfully managing to 
retain the office of personnel compensation:which the CSC had 
annexed (E.O. 67, June 15, 1986, E.O. 67-A, June 22, 1986J. The 
Commission's reorganization did not get a new REO until June 1987 
(E.O. 181). In all, sixteen agencies received more than one 
reorganization executive order, with the Department of 
Transportation and Communication holding the record by being 
amended three times* The Presidential Blue Riboon Commission was 
created and abolished within three months. 
9/ 
See E.O. 177, May 28, 1987; the deadline would have been 
90 days from this date. 
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B. Results of Reorganization 
The Aquino reorganization, as a product of individual 
reorganization plans and incremental decisions, does not have 
the shared structure and nomenclature of Marcos' Integrated 
Reorganization Plan. Some of its features incorporated those of 
tne IRP. For instance, it continued to attach public enterprises 
to the sectoral departments closest to their objective, and 
generally adhered to its departmental model of deconcentration, 
whereby central offices serve as staff bureaus while field 
offices directly deliver services to the public. 
Proclaiming de-Marcosification, the resulting reorganization 
was subject to many ironies. Criticizing the gigantism of the 
Marcosian machinery, the new government increased both the 
offices and the personnel of the bureaucracy. Railing against 
Marcos' huge propaganda machine, the reorganization abolished his 
Ministry of Public Information but retained its functions in. a 
new and probably bigger organization. It also made both 
centripetal and centrifugal moves, making its effective 
decentralization policy difficult to characterize. (This will be 
tne subject of the next section,) 
, As already mentioned, 101 REOs were issued by the President. 
They represented the completed reorganization of 18. ministries 
(later renamed departments), three constitutional bodies, . four 
public enterprises, and 17 other offices. In addition, five were 
abolistied, including two created by. Aquino herself (tne PCGR and 
the Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission), two ministries under 
Marcos - Human Settlements and General Services,, and tne. Economic 
Support Fund Council. Some .30 executive orders created new 
offices, 15 of which were totally new. Of tnes.e, three were 
mandated by the Constitution. Twelve others were renamed or 
converted existing agencies. For instance, the Office of Muslim 
Affairs and Cultural Communities became three agencies, with an 
office eacn for Muslim Affairs, Southern Cultural Communities, 
and Northern Cultural Communities. . Meanwhile, the National 
Tobacco Administration was a consolidation of all agencies 
dealing with that crop. 
Among the really new agencies are those involved in new or 
expanded functions of government, in areas such as human rights, 
the search for and disposition of assets seized from the 
Marcoses, and special urban concerns (e.g., Commission on Human 
Rights, PCGG, the Sequestered Assets Disposition Authority, the 
Presidential Commission for the Urban.Poor and the Housing and 
Urban Development Coordinating Council). 
The Ministry of Public Information, targeted for abolition 
during the campaign, was abolished in name alony with the Office 
of Media Affairs, but was resurrected with "the expansion of the 
scope of responsioility, authority and accountability of the 
Office of the Press Secretary" (E.O. 92, January 12, 1987), : and 
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the creation of the Philippine Information Agency. With their 
sequestration/ a board of administrators for the television and 
radio stations of three corporations also became part of that 
domain (E.O. 11/ April 14, 1986). 
C. Decentrali zation 
Decentralization may occur in several ways. First is by 
delegation of powers, functions and resources from the President 
to the different departments, and within the departments, from 
executives to the rest of the organization. Second is by the 
deconcentration of powers from central to field offices. The 
third mode is through devolution or - the delegation of powers to 
lower political units. Finally, there is extra-governmental 
decentralization, whereby state powers or other functions 
previously : exercised by governmental units are transferred or 
allowed to be used by nongovernmental entities, whether in 
business or voluntary sectors. This was already-discussed in the 
section on the role of government. 
:l. Centralization and the Office of the President 
One of the most predictable recommendations of any 
Philippine general reorganization is the decongestion of the 
Office of the President. This is a reaction to the tendency of 
each incumoent to locate favorite functions directly under him, 
an organizational crowding that most organization experts, 
especially the reorganizers of the next administration, find 
intolerable. Thus the reorganization a new president would 
preside over would attach many of these units to more directly 
relevant sectoral or-staff departments. In the course of his 
term, however, no president has ever resisted creating new 
offices that would now report directly to him, and thus the next 
reorganization would find th^ need to decrease the presidential 
offices again. : 
Under the present regime, there are appreciably more offices 
under the Office of the President than before. This is partly 
accounted for by the number of presidential commissions created 
immediately after the Revolution which signalled the state's new 
commitments to human rights, retrieval of stolen wealth, the 
urban poor, cultural communities as well as general 
reorganization. (Some of these have since been moved from the 
Office or abolished.) In addition, there are the still 
substantial remnants of abolished agencies (after the purging of 
some employees) which have been transferred to the Office of the 
President. They include tno.se of the Ministry of Energy, the 
Ministry of General Services, and the Ministry of Human 
Settlements which, as the Office of Development Management, has 
been absorbed into the Presidential Management Staff. The 
Presidential Management Staff is at the Office of the President 
proper, unlike -the Commissions which might be considered only 
attached to it. Others in the OP proper are the Presidential 
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Staff for Policy Research and Documentation (created by E.O. 908, 
September 14, 1983), and the various offices under the Executive 
Secretary and the Press Secretary. 
Another source of expansion concerns the Cabinet and its 
network of committees. It may be safe to say that no Cabinet has 
met as regularly and as frequently as the Aquino Cabinet. This 
was perceived to be, in the beginning, the result of both the 
President's acknowledged lack of experience and consequent stated 
need for advice from her trusted officials, and her own - also 
proclaimed - desire for participatory decisionmaking. Early on, 
however, a televised Cabinet meeting showed that indeed the 
Cabinet was faced with a lot of issues, but despite some 
arguments, it was not a forum for decisionmaking since the 
President simply listened, and then moved on to the next item, 
with neither the issues being summarized nor decisions reached. 
Later, as this coupled with the agenda becoming too heavy, the 
weekly regularity becoming a strain on the busy officials, and 
the Cabinet arguments becoming too widely publicized, then 
Deputy Executive 'Secretary Fulgencio Factoran Jr. devised the 
Cabinet Assistance System (CAS) to service the Cabinet. 
The CAS is composed of: (a) the meeting of Cabinet 
assistants; (b} the Cabinet Secretariat; (c) the Cabinet level 
committees; and (d) Cabinet clusters. The first component is what 
is generally known as the CAS and is composed of 
undersecretaries (sometimes assistant secretaries) from the 
different departments meeting each Thursday (the day after the 
Cabinet meeting) to discuss how to implement cabinet decisions 
and screen issues that would be brought before the Cabinet, 
ironing out interdepartmental problems and conflicts before 
presenting, a preferred alternative to the Cabinet. The staff-
work was in the beginning done by the CAS members themselves, 
using their own technical staffs. But there was need for a staff 
to see beyond individual department perspectives and the Cabinet 
then designated the Deputy Executive Secretary to be the Cabinet 
Secretary and head the Secretariat for CAS and itself (OP study 
Group 1987). The position has since been given Cabinet rank. 
The Cabinet Secretariat also serviced the Presidential 
Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability until its 
abolition. in time, the CAS blossomed into several sub-
committees, including the Committee to Energize the Bureaucracy^ 
and the Committees on Political Affairs, Industrial Development 
and Economic Development. Charged with easing up the work of the 
political officials with pro-active staff work, it in effect pre-
digested ticklish issues so that decisions could be more easily 
arrived at by the Cabinet. It spearheaded such innovations as 
the mandate review of each department and also looked at new 
program proposals with interdepartmental implications. As the 
emerging nerve center of policy analysis, the Cabinet secretariat 
is also increasingly seen as a power center. 
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Meanwhile, new Cabinet assignments were made. In an effort 
to make sure services are received at local levels, .the CORD 
system was established. Standing for Cabinet Ofticer for 
Regional Development, CORD assigned a Cabinet member to check on 
the needs and services performed in each region and to report on 
his findings to the Cabinet. This is to assure the leadership 
that every region is properly looked after. 
On recommendation of the CORD, another Cabinet body was 
created, the CACIA - Cabinet Action Committee on implementation 
Assistance. Chaired by the NEDA Director-General with the 
Cabinet Secretary as Vice Chairman, it is supposed to be a high-
level monitoring group to see how well projects are being 
undertaken. Because of their number (and perhaps, high 
visibility), the main focus has been to make field visits to 
investigate the progress of infrastructure projects (Mangahas 
1988). 
Looking at the above offices and committees, one inevitably 
asks the question of centralization. The number of offices and 
committees alone gives a sense of so many issues being lodged 
directly at the president's feet. There are at least two other 
factors that reinforce that perception. One is the sheer number 
of officials o* high rank in Malacanang. In mid-1987, there were 
five at the department secretary level (OP Study Group 1987: II, 
56)-, at least three of which had Cabinet rank. Five others were 
undersecretary level. This suggests that at least five were 
directly reporting to 2nd being assigned various tasks by the 
President herself. 
The other factor is the perception of an increasing i ue unict J - • » — IT . , 
tightness in the circle around the executive. This is based 
the seeming limitedness of the choices she has been making 
reqarding key appointments as her term has progressed. The same 
persons or families were being tapped as new vacancies arose: a 
number of the original cabinet were replaced by their 
undersecretaries, another Ferrer came in when then Secretary 
Ferrer of the Local Government was murdered, an official removed 
for incompetence one day was named presidential regional adviser 
soon after, etc. Secretary Jayme moved from Public Works to 
Finance, and was r e p l a c e d by Estuar who was before that an 
infrastructure adviser in Malacanang itself. The current Press 
Secretary was a former Presidential Counsel. The new Agrarian 
Reform Secretary replaced the husband of a Malacanang official, 
and so on. Add this to the extra assignments of a Cabinet 
official as CORD, CACIA and board. member of some public 
enterprises, and the sense of the smallness of the circle from 
which policy advice and managerial competence can be drawn 
' becomes marked. The lack of dispersion of the work and the 
benefits suggests a concentration of trust and maybe even power 
in a small group, regardless of the extent of actual closure. 
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It may also be mentioned that the present leadership is not 
a Manila-bound one. • Top officials from the President dawn 
frequently visit provinces, many of which had not been favored by 
such presence before. It is a mark of personal concern that 
exemplifies for many the sincerity and goodwill of the President. 
Moreover, the trips of the President have their own nation-
building and peace dividends. 
The other side to this, however, is how much it reinforces 
the personalistic and centralized nature of Philippine politics 
and administration which goes against the grain of 
decentralization. For the message it also carries is that 
benefits will not come without the physical presence of the top 
leadership. Flying visits of CORD, CACIA and the top officials 
within each department would be welcome but they should not 
replace the ongoing, regular and comprehensive analysis of the 
reports of performance that are required from all boundary-level 
personnel at set intervals. Members of the bureaucracy complain 
that as more central monitors are formed, more and different 
kinds of reports' are needed, thereby, disrupting their work 
further. Besides, what one sees in trips tends to be the most 
visibl e problems while festering questions which no quick 
presidential directive can solve will remain unknown and 
unresolved. 
2. Executives in the Departments 
The sense of increasing centralization is also engendered by 
the remarkable increase in the number of executives in the 
agencies. Prior to Martial Law, there was one department 
undersecretary - a permanent career official who held office 
continuously from one regime to the next. Marcos added a 
political deputy minister (the nomenclature designed to bolster 
his claim that his system was a variant of the parliamentary 
form) whom he recruited from among the Assemblymen of his 
Batasan. 
In the Aquino government, the second level of cabinet 
departments - now staffed by "undersecretaries" instead of 
"deputy ministers" - "improved on" the Marcosian standard. As of 
July 1987, th£ number of undersecretaries increased from 45 to 
66, and assistant secretaries from 59 to 70. Other executive-
level offices also had additional personnel. 
The increase of executives can also be appreciated in the 
comparison made by DBM between their number "before reorgan-
ization" (it is not clear if "before reorganization" is the point 
of Marcos' departure or later in 1986 after some purges have 
occurred) and as of January 1989 (Table 4). The change is most 
marked in the Departments of Tourism, and Trade and Industry, and 
the Offices of the Media Affairs and Southern Cultural 
Communities. Perhaps a mean ratio may not seem much, until one 
considers the following: 
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Table 5 (cont'd) 
NUMBER OF EXECUTIVES FOR EVERY. 100 NON-EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL IN 
REGIONAL AND CENTRAL OFFICES/ BEFORE AND AFTER REORGANIZATION 
(in %) 
DEPARTMENT/AGENCY BEFORE 
(c. 1986-87) 
AFTER 
(January 1989) 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
1. Department of 
Agriculture 0.43 
2. Department of 
Agrarian Reform 0.48 
3. Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources 0.40 
4. Department of Public 
Works and Highways 0.73 
5. Department of 
Tourism 1.26 
6. Department of Trade 
and Industry 1.32 
7. Department of Transportation 
and Communications 0.32 
8. Office of Energy 
Affairs 1.40 
9. Energy Regulatory 
Board 2.13 
10. Department of Education, 
Culture and Sports 0.017 
11. Department of Health 0.083 
12. Department of Labor 
and Employment 2.32 
13. Department of Social 
Welfare and Development 0.55 
14. Office of Muslim 
Affairs 1.26 
15. Office of Southern 
Cultural Communities 0.37 
0.56 
1.07 
0.85 
0.65 
3.93 
5.16 
0.36 
2.37 
2,45 
0.015 
0.19 
3.16 
0.89 
2 . 6 2 
2.13 
0.13 
0.59 
0.45 
(0.08) 
2.67 
3.-84 
0.04 
0.97 
0.32 
(0.002 
0.107 
0.84 
0.34 
1.36 
1.76 
37 
Table 4 (cont'd) 
DEPARTMENT/AGENCY BEFORE 
(c. 1986-87) 
AFTER 
(January 1989) 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
16. Department of Finance 
17. Department of Foreign 
Affairs 
18. Department of Local 
Government 
19. Department of Budget 
and Management 
20. Department of Science 
and Technology 
21. National Economic and 
Development Authority 
22. Commission on Audit 
23. Civil Service Commission 
24. Commission on Human Rignts 
0.80 
0.46 
0.90 
2.07 
1.32 
4.35 
0.34 
3.37 
3.11 
Mean 1.241 
0.94 
0.75 
0.86 
1.53 
1.38 
4. 32 
0.37 
3.79 
2.25 
1.775 
0.14 
0.29 
(0.04) 
(0.54) 
0.06 
(0.03J 
0.03 
0.42 
(0.86) 
0.611 
Source: Department of Budget and Management, January 1989. 
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(1) These are executives supposed to provide policy 
direction and control, thus, they do not constitute an over-
extended span of control. Below them are several levels of 
supervisory personnel who provide day-to-day guidance over those 
directly serving the public. 
(2) Each new executive also brought in new staff - a clerk 
and a technical assistant at least - so that some of the 
population increase of the rank-and-file may be accounted for by 
the growth of the executive offices, not the increase of people 
at the front line. 
(3) The increase of people at the top does not seem to have 
wrought a perceptible change in the commitment, energy level, and 
performance of civil servants. 
As late as August 1989, a confidential paper emanating from 
the Office of the President decried the lack of such performance 
standards and asked on whom and where the evaluation and 
monitoring of such performance should lie (Committee to Energize 
the Bureaucracy, August 1989). And people at the middle and 
lower levels continue to ask where their agency is headed. What 
then has been the main value of this top-heavy central structure? 
3. Deconcentration 
There have been a number of moves to strengthen regional 
units. The reorganization' completed as of January 1989 appears to 
have generally decreased the number of personnel at central vis-
a-vis regional offices. (Note, however, that this is a comparison 
of two Aquino periods, not a comparison with the Marcos regime,) 
Based on raw data from the DBM-CSC Joint Report (January 1989) 
of 25 offices presenting statistics for their regional units, 18 
had decreased the ratio of ceritral to field personnel, three had 
increased it and in four, there was no change. The biggest 
decreases occurred in the Departments of Tourism, Trade and 
industry, and Budget and Management, the National Nutrition 
Council, the Population Commission and NEDA. It is worth noting 
that the Department of the Budget and Management increased its 
regional force through the opening of eight additional regional 
offices (NEDA 1988: 354). Except for the Commission on Audit, 
the increase of central to regional personnel was not large 
(Table 5) . 
Those that did not change differed a lot from each other. 
The lowest central to regional ratio for both periods was 
registered by DECS, which had almost 3,000 central office 
personnel and over 300,000 field employees. On the other hand, 
the Department of Transportation and Communication did not budge 
from the most centralized personnel structure, maintaining the 
pre-reorganization ratio of 8.5 central office personnel for 
every regional employee. 
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Table 5 (cont'd) 
NUMBER OF CENTRAL FOR EVERY 100 REGIONAL OFFICE PERSONNEL 
IN TWENTY FIVE OFFICES, BEFORE AND AFTER REORGANIZATION 
(In %) 
DEPARTMENT/AGENCY BEFORE 
REORGANIZATION 
(c. 1986-87) 
AFTER 
REORGANIZATION 
(December 1988) 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
A. ECONOMIC SECTOR 
1. Agriculture 0.239 
a. National Nutrition 
Council 2.500 
2. Agrarian Reform 0.088 
3. Environment and Natural Resources 0.350 
4. Public Works and 
Highways 0.209 
5. Tourism 3.870 
6. Trade and Industry 1.588 
7. Transportation and 
Communications 8.549 
B. SOCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 
8. Education, Culture 
and Sports 0.0.-07 
9 * Health 0.036 
10. Labor and Employment 0.709 
a. National Laibor Relations Council 0.288 11. Social Welfare and 
Development 0.094 
a. Commission. on 
.Population 0.8,24 
0.192 
1.731 
0.088 
0.183 
0.163 
1.763 
0.689 
8.499 
0.007 
0.040 
0.642 
0.342 
0.077 
0.327 
(0.047) 
(0.769) 
0 
(0.167) 
(0.046) 
(2.107) 
(0.899) 
(0.050) 
0 
0.0043 
(0.067) 
0.054 
(0.017) 
(0.497) 
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Table 5 (cont'd) 
DEPARTMENT/AGENCY BEFORE AFTER INCREASE 
REORGANIZATION REORGANIZATION (DECREASE) 
(c. 1986-87) (December 1988) 
12. Office of Muslim 
Affairs 0.244 0.324 0.080 
13. Office of Northern 
Cultural Communities none 0.402 0.402 
14. Office of Southern 
Cultural Communities 0.149 0.177 0.028 
C. GENERAL GOVERNMENT"SECTOR 
15. Finance 0'. 416 0.369 (0.047) 
16. Local Government 0.165 0.165 0 
D. SUPPORT SERVICES SECTOR 
17. Budget and Management 3.180 2.503 (0.677) 
18. Science and Technology 3.372 3.086 (0.286) 
19. National Economic and 
Development Authority 1.5'60 0.955 (0.605) 
20. Commission On Audit 0.077 0.731 0.654 
21. Civil Service Commission 0.980 0.841 (0.039) 
22. Commission on 
Human Rights 1.252 0.933 (0.319) 
TOTAL 40.691 25.226 0.63 
AVERAGE 40.691/25 = 1.63 25.226/25 = = 1.01 
Source: Department of Budget and Management, January 1989. 
Witnin regional offices, however# the same pattern is 
repeated as in the agency as a whole: an increase of executive 
vis-^-vis the rank ^nd file in all agencies except the DOF, CSC, 
CHR and DECS (Table 6). The absolute numbers are not big, but 
the differential proportional increases are quite noticeable. If 
Table 6 
NUMBER OF EXECUTIVES FOR EVERY 100 NON-EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL IN 
REGIONAL OFFICES, BEFORE AND AFTER REORGANIZATION 
(In %) 
DEPARTMENT/AGENCY BEFORE AFTER INCREASE 
REORGANIZATION REORGANIZATION (DECREASE) 
(c. 1986-87) (January 1989) 
1. Department of 
Agriculture 0.38 0.52 0.14 2. Department of Agrarian 
Reform 0.30 0.8 6 0.56 3. Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources - 0.34 0.75 0.41 4. Department of Public 
Works and Highways 0.18 0.26 0.08 5. Department of Transport. 
and Communications 1.20 1.38 0.18 6. Department of Education, 
Culture and Sports. 0.0072 0.0071 (0.0001) 7. Department of Health 0.044 0.058 0.014 8. Department of Labor 
and Employment 2.14 2.68 0.54 9. Department of Social 
Welfare Development 0.28 0.62 "0.34 10. Department of Finance 0.77 0.71 (0.06) 11. Department of Local 
Government 0.53 0.56 0.03 12. Department of Budget 
and Management 3.77" 5.00 1.23 13. Department of Science 
and Technology 0.94 _ 1.12 0 .18 14. National Economic and 
Development Authority 2.8 5 3.57 0.72 15. Commission on Audit : 0.17 0.29 0.12 16. Civil Service Commission 3.88 3.55 (0.33) 17. Commission on Human Riynns 0.49 0. 30 (0.19) 
Mean 1.075 1/308 0.157 
Source: Department of Budget and Management, January 1989. 
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this practice is repeated at lower levels, the change may not 
augur very much for decentralization. This makes one suspect 
that there has been no great increase in the number of front-line 
personnel serving the people. Unfortunately, no breakdown at the 
regional, provincial and municipal levels for all agencies was 
available at the time of this writing to pursue this line of 
questioning . 
In addition 
some departments 
levels. Following the old 
divided policy-setting and 
tneir central and regional 
disbursement scheme whereby 
released to regional offices. 
to change in number of units and personnel, 
have delegated more functions to regional 
IRP framework, DOLE and DTI have 
-implementation functions, between 
offices. DBM has adopted a new 
treasury warrants are. directly 
Doing this one better, and because 
direct provincial releases have been allowed for this department 
even under the predecessor regime, DOH has' authorized, .provincial 
and regional levels to prioritize budgets and to allow direct 
release of funds to them. DPWH allows regional directors approval 
of awards and contracts up'to £3 M and similar authority to 
lower-level engineers (up to 9150,000) (NEDA 1988: 354-55). 
Deconcentration can also be indexed by the movement of 
funding allocations from central to local, levels,. The 1988 
budget showed that 24 percent are direct allocations for regional 
operations of the departments. The biggest portion of' these is 
directed to education (87% of DECS budge;t given to region^), 
health (69%) and infrastructure projects (over .80%) ,.,ahd for 
direct transfers to local government units'. These were arrived 
at in consultation with the Regional Development Councils which 
the new government also hopes to strengthen as a coordinating 
mechanism for their respective areas (.DBM 198-8). Such direct 
allocations at least for DPWH are higher than they were during 
the Marcos period (Carifio, Delfin and Borje 1985) and do signal a 
more serious effort at deconcentration. 
In addition to these, the strengthening 
councils at regional and lower levels is also 
oowers and services closer to tne grassroots. 
of development 
bound to move 
4. Devolution 
The government has made two major 
devolution, notably, the projected creation of 
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, and 
greater provincial decentralization., Both are 
up 
attempts 
autonomous 
the move 
in a sense, 
towards 
regions 
towards 
start-
efforts, since neither: is completely operational. 
The Autonomous Regions 
Following the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, then President 
Marcos created two autonomous regions in Mindanao out of the four 
administrative regions in that island. They were the two still 
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predominantly Muslim ...populated regions: IX, Western Mindanao, 
centered in Zamboanga and including the Sulu Archipelago/ and 
XII, Central Mindanao, centered in Marawi City covering the Lanao 
and Cotabato provinces. The two nominally elected their own 
parliaments bat ware notably lacking in other powers to make 
autonomy a reality. Moreover, some interpretations of the Tripoli 
Agreement suggest tnat it was expected to create one regional 
government for all of Mindanao, including the Sulu Archipelago, 
not two separate ones encompassing only a part of the area 
traditionally claimed by Muslims. 
The Constitution of 1987 recognized not only the desire of 
the minorities in Mindanao but also those of the Northern 
cultural communities for handling their own affairs. At the time 
of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, both Mindanao 
and the Cordilleras had their own "lioeration armies" seeking to 
separate their areas:.from the Republic. The Commission sought to 
respond to their demands within the framework of the Philippine 
sovereignty tnrough the provision of autonomous regions "in 
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras." 
The Constitution gave what is now regarded as a "directory" 
mandate to have an organic act for these regions by January 1989. 
In preparation for this, the government created consultative 
committees in both regions to draft their respective autonomy 
acts. At the time of this writing, only the organic act for 
Mindanao has been passed in Congress. That will now go through a 
plebiscite to be participated in by all qualified voters in 
Mindanao and Sulu. 
The salient features of both proposed organic acts include a 
regional governor, parliaments and courts; devolution of 
functions -now performed by national sectoral departments, the 
promulgation and collection of local taxes, among others. At 
issue are: the scope of the autonomous region (majority vote of 
each province will determine inclusion in the regions), the form 
of the legislative-executive structure (the Cordillera Council 
originally proposed a parliamentary system), what to do with 
existing regional armies, how to incorporate particular cultural 
laws and practices within the framework of a Philippine state 
such as ancestral lands, and the specific division of national-
regional powers. 
Aside from questions, internal to the proposed autonomous 
regions, the policy raises questions affecting the rest of the 
country as well. For instance, it, has revived the issue of 
federalizing the republic, a structure that may be better suited 
to an archipelago than the highly centralized unitary system now 
in place. The question has been raised why only areas with 
cultural communities or those with separatist tendencies should 
enjoy autonomy i:f indeed bringing the government closer to the 
people would be the way, of democratic development. Nevertheless, 
some people also feel , that giving autonomy may lead to the 
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dismemberment of 
has not really 
federalist idea 
themselves from 
reform. 
provincial Autonomy 
- Malacanang has given block grants of §>120 M.each to four 
provinces as an experiment in provincial autonomy. The 
disbursement scheme has also been altered to allow direct and 
speedy releases. The four are Laguna,-Tarlac, Negros Occidental 
and Davao. They are among the most highly developed provinces 
and have earlier shown capacity to harness their resources, which 
raises questions about the value of tne experiment. If 
successful, will the results be transferable to other less 
endowed provinces? Will failure practically doom the grant of 
more power to provinces? What is the definition of success or 
failure? 
The choice of provinces aside, what is noteworthy in this 
decentralization program is the fact that it is truly an 
experiment and both central and provincial offices are learning 
as it proceeds. On the whole, this is a posijtive ~ development 
that is exciting. On the negative side, it is "again directed 
from Malacanang rather than the agency mandated for this; purpose 
- the Department of Local Government - implying an Office of the 
President-Department problem that needs quick and decisive 
resolution. 'Moreover, procedures are set up only as problems are 
met. For instance, the definition of whether it is a national or 
a local fund was not immediately resolved. This has implications 
on such matters as to: whether or not the Sangguniang 
Panlalawigan would need to be involved in the allocation of 
funds; amounts received but not to be expended within a specified 
period can be placed in interest-bearing accounts; funds could be 
granted to nongovernmental organizations, etc. It might also be 
suggested tnat close monitoring and comparison of the provinces 
be undertaken not to institute central control but as a means of 
learning from this process anfl transferring the lessons to a 
bigger, more inclusive decentralization program. 
Preliminary information suggests that the four provinces 
have taken different approaches to the block grant.. Tarlac and 
Laguna have allocated most of these; resources to infrastructure 
and livelihood, with government taking the lead; Negros has 
mobilized foundations and NGOs. The province of Davao, however, 
deserves special notice for its use of the grant as means of 
operationalizing its ideals of equity and participation (Amatong 
1989). For instance, part of the package (one million pesos each) 
has "been allocated in turn as a block grant to each municipality 
in the province, thus giving their mayors the same autonomy the 
national government has extended to the governors. Meanwhile, 
most of the funds remaining with the province has been allocated 
the nation in a weak state where centralization 
worked. In addition, recent converts to the 
seem to be pursuing it as a means of exempting 
national laws, notably, comprehensive agrarian 
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to projects long demanded oy barangay constituencies,, but on 
condition that community organization and people's participation 
mark the planning and implementation of such projects. (Tne 
current provincial governor is an engineer by profession, but 
when he was a mayor, he had been known for his ability to 
mobilize community participation for his various projects, having 
even then received various awards for this effort.) 
Remaining Devolution Issues 
The two efforts towards devolution have actually differing 
implications. Is the region or the province the more appropriate 
level for development and autonomy? If the region is made 
autonomous, will it take some of the powers that may now be 
enjoyed by the four provinces in the experiment? The factors 
drawn in favor of one or the other level actually touch on the 
same things: size, homogeneity of culture, adequacy of natural, 
physical and human resources, etc. 
The government has also put forward a new local autonomy 
code that attempts to increase power devolution. 
A boost to provincial powers n'as been the recent disbandment 
of the National Coordinating Council on Integrated Area 
Development (NACIAD) and the transfer of its project offices to 
the respective, provincial governments or to RDCs, if spanning 
more than one province. This would allow the provinces greater 
control over the development pace of their respective territories 
and add new resources to their effort, since IAD projects have 
received considerable development assistance (Carifio, Palarca and 
Reyes 1988). 
V. ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
The Constitution of 1987 set the tone for the emphasis on 
high standards of conduct for public officials. Article XI, 
Section 1 states: 
Public office is a public trust. Public officers 
and employees must at all times be accountable to the 
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, 
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism 
and justice and lead modest lives. 
It added betrayal of the public trust to sedition, treason, 
bribery, graft and corruption, culpable violation of the 
Constitution and other high crimes, as impeachable offenses. 
However, it made tne process of impeachment somewhat harder, by 
requiring one-third of all the members of the House instead of 
the one-fiftn as in the 1973 Constitution to initiate impeachment 
cases. Conviction might be easier, requiring a two-thirds vote 
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of the Seriate (a much smaller number than the two-thirds of the 
Batasan). It provided for strictures against conflict of 
interest and full public disclosure of personal wealth to 
facilitate obedience to ethical norms. 
It retained the Commission on Elections, the Commission on 
Audit, the Civil Service Commission and the Sandiganbayan as 
independent constitutional bodies and added the Ombudsman and the 
Commission on Human Rights, each in its own area watching over 
the accountability of government in the conduct of suffrage, 
financial and personnel transactions, and political and 
bureaucratic behavior. The three branches of government would 
also be responsible to the people through the operation of the 
system of checks and balances. The goals of the state embrace the 
promotion of "a just and dynamic social order that will ensure 
prosperity and independence of the nation and freedom from 
poverty" (Article II, Sec. 9). 
A. The Current Thrusts 
• To implement the intent of these provisions, laws activating 
the constitutional bodies and operationalizing their standards 
have been passed. These include the conceptualization of good 
government as one of integrity and responsibility (Executive 
Order No. 1, Feoruary 28, 1986, creating the Presidential 
Commission on Good Government, PCGG) and the passage of the 
Etnical Standards Act (Republic Act No. 6713, February 20, 1989). 
The Ethical Standards Act was originally drafted at the instance 
of first PCGG Cnairman Jovito R. Salonga in pursuance, of the 
Commission's third function: 
The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above 
practices shall not be repeated in any manner under the 
new government, and the institution of adequate 
measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption (E.O. 
No. 1, Sec. 2-c, February 28, 1986). 
As such its heart is the statement of norms upholding commitment 
to the public interest, democracy, justness and fairness, 
political neutrality, professionalism, nationalism, and simple 
living. To accomplish the intent of these standards, the law 
also includes provisions on the filing and public disclosure of 
the statement of net worth of each government official and 
employee (a stricter version of the provisions of Repuolic Act 
No. 3019/ the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), public 
disclosure of relatives in government, divestment of assets by 
public officials with private interests conflicting with their 
public duties, and immediate response to public demands and 
inquiries. On the positive side, it has also instituted an 
awards and incentives system for exemplary public servants and 
value development programs which each agency is supposed to 
undertake regularly for its employees. 
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The new government has raised high hopes that the problem of 
graft and corruption - a major source of disenchantment of the 
electorate with each preceding administration - will finally be 
resolved since Corazon Aquino has been widely seen as a paragon 
of virtue and clean living. However, it takes more than 
exemplary presidential image to eradicate the problem. 
Accordingly, organizational and process changes were instituted 
in; independent constitutional bodies and in the thrfee branches of 
government. 
Constitutional bodies involved in improving methods of 
performance are the Sandiganbayan (administrative court), the 
Ombudsman, the Commission on Audit and the Civil Service 
Commission. Of these, the 'new addition is the Ombudsman, an 
adaptation from the Swedish innovation and given an indigenized 
name - Tanodbayan -r by Ferdinand Marcos. Like the original, the 
Tanodbayan was a people's watchdog with public assistance and 
prosecutory functions. However, it was only the latter set that 
was developed. Thus, when the Constitutional Commission was 
deliberating, the incumbent Tanodbayan himself, endorsed the move 
to create two organizations, each to take care of a different 
facet of the Ombudsman's role. What is now known as the 
Tanodoayan is technically tne Office o-f the Special Prosecutor, 
involved in cases affecting the conduct of public officials. 
Meanwhile, the Ombudsman retains investigatory and 
prosecutory functions and the delineation of its jurisdiction 
vis-a-vis the Special Prosecutor remains unclear. In addition, 
the Ombudsman now undertakes the task of intervening in behalf of 
the public in cases where government agencies have not acted 
speedily, ignored or otherwise seemed to the complainant to be 
unresponsive to his needs. This task is the main responsibility 
of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman which has received a steady 
stream of requests and complaints from many citizens since his 
appointment. A new administrative order (from the President of 
the Philippines) has directed each office to create a public 
assistance and complaints unit (PACU) which will provide it much 
needed assistance. However, such units will be composed of people 
designated to perform this work on top of their regular duties. 
Moreover, the unit head must have sufficient authority to effect 
adequate and speedy response to public demands, suggesting at 
least the level of assistant secretary. Realizing that persons 
of this caliber and responsibility probably have enough functions 
before this new assignment, one can only nope that they can still 
give public assistance the priority it deserves. 
Apart from the additional work, PACUs report directly to the 
head of agency, rather than to the Ombudsman. This has the 
advantage of recognizing that responsive service is a management 
responsibility, not something imposed from above, but part of the 
definition of what is required to administer a program. However, 
given the previous government record of unsatisfactory public 
service, more direct and strong links with an independent body 
charged with the same function could also provide a distinct 
advantage. 
The law gives the Ombudsman pro-active functions - that is, 
it may initiate inquiries and recommend improvements in service 
delivery even without prior public complaints. So far, the office 
has assisted a number of people whose problems with various 
government agencies have been unresponded to for some time 
(Ombudsman 1989). This preventive and promotive role has been one 
of the main ingredients of success of its Hong-kong counterpart, 
the Independent Commission against Corruption which has 
corruption prevention and community relations departments, in 
addition to the enforcement tasks undertaken by its operations 
department (Lee 1987). Attention to these aspects could produce 
results with longer-term impacts than its current case-to-case 
activities. This is not to denigrate the importance of the 
immediate and understanding response that it is doing now, since 
that has to be part of any effort to restore public confidence of 
a caring government. Nevertheless, it has to be given resources 
to take up this other function also. 
The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency 
of the government. The 1973 Constitution transformed it from a 
staff arm of the executive to an independent constitutional body. 
Four new decisions bear on improving methods of performance: (a) 
the increase of the passing grade in CSC eligibility tests from 
75 to 80 percent, (b) the "Do Away witn Red Tape" (DART) program, 
(c) ethics and accountability seminars, and (d) incentives for 
ethical performance. The first signalled the desire of the 
Commission to recruit better civil servants, an important 
symbolic move, considering the remaining low prestige Of the 
bureaucracy. 
The DART would do away with red tape, and like the 
Ombudsman, welcomed public complaints, tnis time specifically 
about seemingly unnecessary or irrational procedures. Not 
surprisingly, the first complaints were mostly directed at the 
Commission itself, which had unexplained processes of its own and 
which it had to correct lest it risk the program's credibility. 
However, in calling another agency's attention to possible 
defects in its systems, it could only rely on its goodwill and 
sense of responsiveness, since that function - unless touching on 
personnel issues - is not squarely, within its jurisdiction. 
Emphasis on ethics and accountability was started as soon as 
the new government came in. However, with Republic Act No. 6713, 
tnis subject became a mandated function, a value development 
seminar being required for all employees within the first year of 
implementation of the law. As it stands now, such seminars are 
still largely lecture-type discussions which at their best could 
provide some inspiring and challenging moments. However t more 
innovative and people-involving methods have to be devised and 
tested in terms of both their capacity to bring immediate and 
long-term desired oranges in performance. 
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Performance awards are part of the positive thrust embodied 
in R.A. 6713. The criteria suggest a search for exemplary 
government employees who manifest ethical performance in 
relatively obscure and sensitive positions. The first awards are 
yet to be made and tneir capacity to provide incentives and set 
the tone for public service in the bureaucracy cannot be assessed 
yet. However, there was a disturbing point raised" during the 
formulation of guidelines for RA 6713 in that a seeming dichotomy 
was made between ethical activity and adequate performance, in 
that a person wno has otherwise been lazy or ineffective in his 
work could be eligible for an award if at one point he showed 
spectacular honesty, say, in returning a bag full of money. Yet, 
rectitude must not be separated from professionalism, 
effectiveness and other aspects of exemplary public service. 
In addition, both Houses of Congress have set up their own 
ethics committees to look into the performance of their 
membership as well as to undertake hearings on bills affecting 
the accountability of the political leadership and the 
bureaucracy as a whole. Investigating committees such as the Blue 
Ribbon Committee in the Senate and standing committees of each 
House have been active in conducting hearings to get to the 
bottom of questionable government transactions that have been 
unearthed by news reporters, cause-oriented organizations and 
their own sleuths. These have generally been open to the public 
or, at least, are reported widely in mass media. 
The judiciary itself has been concerned about the slow 
disposition of cases despite Constitutional provisions since 1973 
of deadlines during which decisions have to be made. On the 
principle that "justice delayed is justice denied," the Supreme 
Court has initiated an experimental procedure, involving a small 
sample of courts, which will try cases on a continuous basis, in 
lieu of the sequential procedures being followed at present. 
This pilot project is too new to be evaluated. 
1. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) 
The executive nas its own agencies for, enhancing 
accountability. An unprece dented move was the creation of PCGG 
which was charged primarily with the return of wealth plundered 
by officials and cronies of the predecessor-regime and also with 
the inculcation of higher ethical standards for this and 
succeeding, governments. It is in the first function that the 
Commission has become both well-known and controversial. 
Conscious that its activities to retrieve the national wealth 
must not go beyond the bounds of due process, it has sequestered 
(instead of confiscating or expropriating) firms and assets 
allegedly owned or controlled by the fallen dictator. The process 
of establishing ownership has been difficult since Marcos' legal 
mind wove a web of legalistic labyrinths that required 
perspicacious sleuthing. It also extended into several 
countries such as the United States (where the former- president 
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has since oeen charged under the Racketeering and Corruption 
Act), Switzerland, Hongkong and Japan. In addition, . the 
authoritarian government's tenure of over a decade and its 
leader's personal control over a broad swath of the economy' have 
involved many more people than could actually be embraced by the 
term "presidential crony." As such, the interlock of enterprises, 
banks/ law firms, accountants, mass media and other sectors 
appeared to actually engulf the whole society, or more 
accurately, its elite individuals and families. Indeed, even 
president Aquino's first cabinet and senatorial/congressional 
slate included some people who had served Marcos, and, after the 
first set of commissioners, even PCGG members were being linked 
to Marcosian interests at one level or another. With such wide 
Marcosification, opposition to PCGG, however exemplary its 
conduct, could not have been avoided. 
PCGG in fact created some of its own problems. It was prey 
to some naivete, which it perhaps shared with the rest of the new 
administration, in putting trust in persons who offered their 
services with the main qualification of also having opposed 
Marcos in the past. (Parenthetically, one may assert that 
everyone underestimated the greed of people who have been out of 
power for twenty years!) The first problems arose from volunteer 
fiscal agents, a few of whom threw their weight around 
sequestered companies, charged very high expenses or did not have 
the patience to follow the accountability procedures of 
government. Belatedly, PCGG set up systems for recruitment, 
training and evaluation, and disciplined its own ranks. Nonethe-
less, rumors of abuse, 'fueled by Marcos-connected media, had 
already tarnished its reputation. It cannot be overemphasized 
that breach of trust was made by only a few volunteers; the 
majority proved to be a credit to the service. 
PCGG also did not appreciate enough its comparison to 
Caesar's wife. Two of its first set of commissioners were linked 
to corruption deals even though neither of the accusation's was 
proven. However unjustly, the public did not disassociate these 
personal failings from the Commission. Controversies involving 
sequestered firms also engulfed the next set of commissioners. At 
the time of this writing, the third set of commissioners face 
problems of nepotism unearthed by the Civil Service Commission 
itself. 
Also, PCGG became part of the political football. Initially 
headed by Jovito R. Salonga, a respected former senator-lawyer 
who was 'also a close friend of. the President's assassinated 
husband, PCGG gradually lost its standing as a presidential 
commission since what seemed to linger in the public's m i n d w a s 
Salonga's political rivalry to the president's side of the 
family. This continued even after Salonga's mantle had been 
inherited by Ramon Diaz, a highly respected administrator, whose 
resignation letter hinted of problems between the PCGG and 
relatives of the president who appeared to have since gained 
control of some important sequestered firms. 
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These problems.aside, the achievements of PCGG should not be 
underestimated. It has set up a complex international system for 
the retrieval of plunder, serving notice to dictators and others 
inclined toward kleptocracy that crime does not pay. It has 
stopped the Marcoses from enjoying most of this wealth (although 
their present lifestyle evidence that they still have a lot under 
their control) and has brought to their knees a few of their 
conspirators turned state witnesses. It has been able to return 
several millions to the Philippine treasury for use in the 
agrarian reform program. 
2. The Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and 
Accountability 
A committee headed by then Presidential Counsel Rene 
Saguisag was the first body to look into graft and corruption 
under the new government. However, while it received a big 
number of letters from the public, it was never fully 
operational. The President's Committee on Public Ethics and 
Accountability was formed in 1987 and was headed by Cabinet 
Secretary Jose P. de Jesus. It regarded graft and corruption as 
a managerial problem which could be tackled by increasing its 
risks and decreasing its benefits. It also decentralized graft-
busting by placing responsibility for the ethical performance of 
each department on the head of agency, and appointing action 
officers in each agency to monitor the performance .of its 
officials and employees and initiate the investigations against 
them if cause for such be necessary. 
PCPEA placed great responsibility on the action officers who 
were doing these tasks on top of their regular assignments and 
without additional staff or financial support. As of May 1988, 
the 39 action officers had file'd 1,102 cases and had managed to 
have dismissed or suspended 18 percent of those involved 
(Singson 1988). However, some of t^em became frustrated within a 
few months because of the perceived lack of support from their 
agency heads, the dearth of personnel and material assistance, 
and the absence of regular contact and encouragement from the 
mother Committee which hardly met. The PCPEA was abolished early 
in 1989 and its functions transferred to the Ombudsman. 
3. Agency Reform Measures 
In addition to central anti-corruption measures, individual 
departments and agencies undertook their own attacks. The 
Department of Health improved systems of bidding and purchases. 
After 100 days, DOH reported having saved the government §13 M 
(MOH 1986). Its style includes keeping tab on prices, changing 
awards committees frequently and involving outsiders (at one 
point, the Operasyon Walang Lagay) as monitors. DOH was also 
able to withstand a strong lobby by the pharmaceutical industry, 
and by one account, the American Chamber of Commerce and the US 
Embassy itself, in pushing through its National Drug Policy, one 
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principal aspect of which is the useof generic drugs. The DOH 
method has also been used by some other departments and local 
governments with similar results. 
The most celebrated single case of battling corruption is 
that of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) under 
Miriam Defensor-Santiago. (She has since moved to the scandal-
ridden Department of Agrarian Reform as its new Secretary.) This 
involves several prongs. On: the positive side/ it includes the 
distribution of proceeds of the "express line" under which 
clients get faster service - to employees as a regular monthly 
bonus. Although the amount is about £10,000 per person monthly 
for those at the international airport (CID 1988), it is still 
way below the alleged corruption take of most employees. However, 
it has the advantage of being aboveboard and also many times over 
the basic salaries of civil servants at their level. (Santiago 
1988). CID also instituted an ethics seminar, the graduates of 
which were posted to the more sensitive areas of the agency•s 
operations, with Commissioner Santiago herself at the forefront. 
In addition, Mrs. Santiago got the media On her side. This 
last aspect has its detractors. Media coverage of Mrs. .Santiago 
did at times border on propaganda, but it must be understood that 
the support of print and broadcast reporters and columnists was 
important in allowing the CID to be able to explain its goals and 
methods to the public, thus as a way of garnering further 
support. At the same time, it was also a protection against both 
the threat on one's life and the temptation that may be offered 
by those disadvantaged by the corruption drive. 
CID has also not been lacking in enforcement methods. It 
has warned and then removed for cause employees found to be still 
violating the law. Moreover, Mrs. Santiago has not been easy on 
their clients eitner, thus striking fear on the hearts of both 
sides of the transaction (for this, reason, increased risk has 
also increased the cost of corruption, and employees who dare 
continue the practice can hope for an even bigger pay-off). Mrs. 
Santiago, recognizing this, has said wryly that it was a 
protection on her life - no one would kill the person who single-
handedly had increased his corruption take (Santiago 1988) . 
B. The Continuing Problem of Corruption 
On the whole then* there have been a number of very positive 
moves to increase ethics and accountability in government since 
the start of the Aquino regime. Nevertheless, the- problem has 
continued in alarming proportions. As early as 1987, Cardinal 
Sin had adverted to the proble'm in one of his pastoral talks. 
Opposition leaders have of course never ceased to refer to it. 
Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan of the "Supreme Court also decried 
courtroom corruption in a speech-before the judiciary and members 
of the bar. individualistic graft - petty as well as large-scale 
- and systemic corruption of small and scandalous proportions 
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continue to take place. Gun smuggling by a legislator, the 
mysterious sinking of a ship carrying rice, cornering of the buko 
market, overpricing of land for agrarian reform: these hog the 
headlines, while small people are subject to harassments by tax 
collectors, license givers, business inspectors and regulators, 
and the police, even though they may not have violated any law or 
ordinance. Varela's ongoing study of the administrative culture 
(1989) suggests that civil servants themselves believe their 
organizations continue to nurture corruption, thus confirming 
what the public decries in survey after survey. 
President Aquino seemed incredulous at first* challenging 
friends and enemies alike to produce documents. But through the 
last months of 1988 and the early months of 1989, she has 
referred to the problem in several speeches, challenging the 
Ombudsman to even catch a "big fish" within a month (the deadline 
was not met). And in her State of the Nation address on July 24, 
1989, she acknowledged the magnitude and gravity of corruption in 
her government, expressing her sorrow for being criticized for 
.exactly the legacy she wanted to give the nation. In an earlier 
speech to the National Coalition for Transparency, she had said: 
Corruption has returned, if not on the same scale, certainly with 
equal shamelessness (Cagurangan June 20, 1989: 1). 
The magnitude of corruption under the Aquino government may 
be partly a consequence of a press that has been freed from the 
clutches of a dictatorship. Certainly, the plunder, now widely 
known to have been perpetrated by Marcos was not the citizens' 
daily reading fare .when he was still in office. Another 
"democratic" factor contributing to the high level of cases filed 
in the Sandiganbayan and other courts is a sign of increased 
confidence in the possibility of getting justice (added to the 
well-known ploy of an accused person trying to get revenge by a 
countersuit against the first petitioner). 
The sense of increased corruption may also be partly 
resulting from the strong competition of the twenty-or-so 
metropolitan newspapers for readership that seeks sensational and 
biting news. The broadcast media has also joined in the fray, 
such that even a sports talkshow could focus on an alleged 
corruption scandal (the construction of the Ninoy Aquino Stadium) 
instead of its. usual entertainment and sporting themes. One must 
likewise take note of the continuing hold of certain "Marcos 
loyalists" on newspapers and radio stations, which may be 
expected to regale in putting in broad relief failings of the 
Aquino administration. Thus, one may concede that part of the 
perception of widespread corruption is fed by the effects of 
these factors. Because of these, it is unfruitful to discuss 
whether or not the extent of corruption at this time is greater 
or less than or the same as in Marcos' era. 
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Nevertheless, the fact remains that the number of reported 
cases is high, and in the eyes of many, higher than what it 
should be, given a president that after three years is still 
untainted by rumors of corruption. "Leadership by example" was a 
major missing factor in attempts to battle corruption in previous 
regimes. Thus, now that it is here, the fact of continuing 
corruption becomes even more frustrating. 
There are other characteristics of present-day corruption 
that bear notice. First, because of the moral standards of the 
president, corruption has become less "centralized" and more 
"democratic." A number of syndicates continue to exist - for 
instance, in Customs, CID, BIR, even DAR - but these do not seem 
to be orchestrated from the center and up to now have not been 
alleged to be paying dues to the person at the top (this may also 
be one reason for the reported magnitude of corruption). There 
are also a number of top officials aside from the President whose 
integrity remains unquestioned. 
Second, corruption scandals fester because they stay in 
newspaper headlines for a long time before something is done 
about them. Protection of the high official appears to rate 
higher than protection of the service, such that the whole 
department or program is stigmatized before the accused "go on 
leave." Often, this is at the instance of the person himself, 
who, however, does not do it immediately but who is later wearied 
out by the continuing pressure of investigations and newspaper 
headlines. Preventive suspension wnich is meted out to lower-
level employees has not been given to the most prominent 
officials. 
This is not to say that wnen one is accused, one is 
immediately presumed guilty. However, it does suggest that the 
continued stay in office of a person so accused, especially if a 
big fish, affects public perception of the program negatively. 
And the official being unable to prepare for his defense while 
continuously interrupted in trying to do other work, will not 
help either. Thus, a decisive action at the outset would be kind 
to both the government and the official in hot water. 
Third, the protective mantle around top officials reinforces 
the already mentioned distance between the civil service and the 
executive leadership. A working paper of the Committee to 
Energize the Bureaucracy (1989) seems to regard corruption as 
largely, if not purely, a bureaucratic phenomenon, with the 
executive leadership seen practically as hapless victims of the 
manipulations of their subordinates. This was also the implicit 
defense of the former Secretary of Agrarian Reform. This 
attitude is surprising in a government that originally regarded 
corruption as a management problem, but faced with its 
continuation, absolves management of responsibility. Role 
modeling is not simply, for an executive, keeping one's hands 
clean. It must also include competent administration - which 
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always includes knowledge of; and control over, the various 
processes and performances of the people below him or her. Our 
rules still require that transactions of a certain magnitude 
should NOT be delegated. This is not merely a centralizing 
device but a means to ensure executive responsibility. In 
addition, it must also involve decisive action against those who 
do dirty their hands, whatever the cost. This kind of 
management was what was most admirable about Miriarrf Santiago's 
performance in the CID. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Because of the broadness of the field of public adminis-
tration, this paper has only managed to assess four key areas of 
public administration. Two - the role of government, and ethics 
and accountability - center on the criteria submitted by the PCGR 
as values that Aquino's administration should exemplify. The 
remaining two describe important personnel and organizational 
changes that profoundly affect the way the government will be 
able to deliver on the promises of power dispersion and ethical 
performance. 
A. The Role of Government 
In the last three years, and with the commitment to 
redemocratization, the government has expanded significantly. 
The expansion took place not only because of the installation of 
a legislative structure but also because of the reality of 
parliamentary lawmaking itself. It has also expanded due to the 
demands of human rights and justice, as it has attempted to 
retrieve stolen wealth, minimize 'violations of civil liberties as 
well as provide more comprehensive programs of agrarian reform 
and education. And although it had attempted to reduce its 
presence in the economy, its pace on this score has been slow. 
This is not an altogether negative development since privatiza-
tion and some forms of public participation may lead to the 
stronger control of foreign as well as domestic dominant groups 
and a corollary weakening of the voices of those for whom social 
justice is proclaimed. 
B. Personnel Changes 
The political leadership and the civil service have 
drastically changed in size, composition and orientation in the 
last three years. Among its salient features are changes in the 
political leadership, purges and high turnover, the use of 
volunteers, the salary structure, the rise of employee organiza-
tions and the new militarization of the civilian force. The 
cabinet is now largely a technocratic group instead of the 
political personages that dominated the original body. It has 
increasingly been moved towards the center, as persons represent-
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ing diverse views of the left and the right have been changed by 
less ideological, more technically minded persons. In the civil 
service, meanwhile, the evaluation of all personnel and the 
summary dismissal or courteous demand for the resignation of 
others have produced a lot of instability and demoralization, 
leading to service slowdown lest mistakes be made. This has 
grave implications on what may be expected as results of 
government performance. 
Despite the removal of large numbers of personnel, the 
bureaucracy actually increased, as new persons, largely from the 
private sector and sometimes coming in initially as volunteers, 
have been absorbed. The military presence in the non-
authoritarian government has not actually diminished, as was 
expected, since retired general? now occupy what have been 
reserved for civilians in the defense structure. Also, soldiers 
continue to be called to perform as soldiers in what are 
essentially civilian programs. 
Pressures for changes in salary were made almost as soon as 
the new government came in. It has responded with a number of 
piecemeal efforts, culminating in the Salary Standardization Law 
of 1989. While the magnitude of salary changes over the last 
three years have been positive arid large, differentials have been 
in favor of CESOs and other top officials who also continue to 
receive other incentives in cash and kind. Moreover, wage 
increases for those at the bottom have occurred only after much 
pressure and protest from their organizations. 
In fact, a marked feature of the Aquino dispensation is the 
rise of employee organizations. They have increased in number as 
the civil servants' defense against purging and poor working 
conditions. A few, however, have also started to become 
instruments for demanding ethics and accountability from their 
superiors. 
C. Government Reorganization 
The bureaucracy under Aquino has changed its profile as it 
has regularized, abolished or privatized public enterprises; 
created, strengthened or removed regular departments; and 
modified positions and units in regular departments. The 
reorganization process has not been as participatory and 
transparent as it had proclaimed. Moreover, plans have been 
frequently changed or left pending for a long time, adding to the 
uncertainty and fear of the persons to be affected. On the whole, 
it has maintained the general structure created by the Integrated 
Reorganization Plan of 1972, with public enterprises attached to 
relevant sectors, and central offices becoming staff agencies, 
with the regional levels as the line units. It has not fought 
successfully the gigantism of the Marcosian bureaucracy nor has 
it dismantled its propaganda network. 
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Decentralization was discussed in terras of four types: 
delegation, deconcentration, devolution and privatization. The 
first looked largely at centralization and the office of the 
president, and pointed to its expansion, increasing, tightness and 
desire for personally handling matters that contribute to the 
perception of centripetality in this aspect. Within the 
departments, this is complemented by the increase in the number 
of executives throughout the agency. 
Deconcentration, on the other hand, may be evidenced by the 
greater expansion of regional vis-^-vis central offices, although 
this is somewhat dampened by the relatively high increases of 
executives even at regional levels. Fund allocations directly to 
regions and individual moves of various departments also move 
towards giving greater powers to regional offices. 
The devolution experience is towards both the regional and 
provincial levels. At the region, two of the most underserved 
will enjoy autonomy due to the successful demand of their 
population who arG cultural communities and have not felt equal 
treatment with the rest of the Filipinos. 
At the province, the experiment in autonomy is granted to 
four of the richest units. At least one of these attempts to 
operationalize equity and community participation at the 
provincial level that presage appropriate handling of local 
autonomy, if finally granted. 
It is interesting to note that regional and provincial 
autonomy has been granted to the poorest and richest, 
respectively. The contrasts suggest that the policymakers have 
not yet made a decision as to which would be the appropriate 
level of development. Either one can be the focus of devolution 
but the choice of one or the other can have important 
implications on power and resource allocations and on popular 
support that have to be thoroughly discussed and understood. 
D. Ethics and Accountability 
To de-Marcosify is to change ultimate and instrumental 
values of the political system. Among the instrumental values, 
ethics and accountability issues, reduction of red tape, 
avoidance of waste and increase of productivity take first 
priority. This has included the passage of new laws, the 
inculcation of or re-orientation towards ethical norms, and the 
creation and strengthening of agencies to check and improve 
methods of performance such as the constitutional commissions, 
presidential and cabinet committees, legislative oversight 
committees, and nongovernmental organizations. 
Despite all these efforts, the clear message is that graft 
and corruption continues throughout the political system. Partly, 
this is a result of reporting, which in turn can be traced to the 
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greater freedoms enjoyed by the press and the populace at large. 
At the same time, however, one must acknowledge that it is 
occurring, and that both behavior and culture still seem 
supportive of graft. More decisive action against it and 
against high officials who undertake it would be needed if we are 
to look forward to some minimization. "Leadership by example" 
should mean not only non-involvement in corruption, but 
successful enforcement and acceptance of management 
responsibility for controlling it. 
On the whole, the performance of the Aquino administration 
in the area of public administration at mid-term is mixed. A 
number of important initiatives in expanding the social and 
democratizing programs, decentralization and enhancing 
accountability have been made. It is expected that as 
reorganization is completed, the bureaucracy will finally 
stabilize and be better able to undertake its assigned programs, 
particularly with the initiation and implementation of its value-
development strategies. However, there are still many areas that 
need special attention. Decentralization is a centrifugal 
program. This means "letting go" and developing and recognizing 
the capacities of those at the bottom and not only those of the 
topmost political leadership. Moreover, more information is 
needed regarding i_f and how current devolution and 
deconcentration efforts actually result in services and 
empowerment for the people. Beyond this, selective targeting 
also needs to be enhanced. 
Corruption continues to eat at the fiber of the nation. 
Fighting speeches must be coupled with decisiveness in cleaning 
up processes as well as in hurting the people who bleed the 
country dry. The advantage of finally having a role model in 
Malacafiang should not be dissipated. 
Finally, to proclaim democracy is not enough. The government 
must seriously consider how the mission of the state will change 
in this light, especially how it must change directions to 
deliver not only services but also social justice to the 
underprivileged and independences to the whole nation. 
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Appendix 1 
REORGANIZATION EXECUTIVE ORDERS (REOs) 
I. EXECUTIVE ORDERS CREATING OFFICES: 30 
Constitutional bodies: (3) 
Human Rights Commission, EO 163, EO 163-A 
Office of the Ombudsman, EO 243 
Office of the Special Prosecutor, EO 244 
Converted/Renamed: (12) 
Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization, EO 5 
Sugar Regulatory Administration, EO 18 
Philippine Information Agency, EO 100 
Philippine Convention and Visitors Corp., EO 120-A 
Office of Muslim Affairs, EO 122-A , EO 295 
Office for Southern Cultural Communities, EO 122-B , EO 294 
Office for Southern Cultural Communities, EO 122-C, EO 293 
Energy Regulatory Board, EO 172 
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulating Board, 
EO 202 
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, EO 246 
Kalinga Special Development Project, EO 302 
National Tobacco Administration, EO 245 
New Offices: (15) 
Presidential Commission on Good Government, EO 1, EO 13 
Presidential Committee on Human Rights, EO 8 
Board of Administrators for BBC, RPN and IBC, EO 11 
Presidential Committee for the Urban Poor, EO '82 
HUDCC, EO 90 
Agricultural Credit Policy Council, EO 113 
Presidential Commission on Culture and Arts, EO 118 
Corporate Affairs Group, EO 127-A 
Council for Investments in Trade, Industry, Tourism, 
Agriculture, Natural Resources, Transportation and 
Communications, EO 136 
Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission, EO 150 
Aurora Integrated Area Development Project Office, EO 265 
Presidential Council for Youth Affairs, EO 274 
Sequestered Assets Disposition Authority, EO 286 
Council of State, EO 305 
Energy Coordinating Council, EO 338 
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II. EXECUTIVE ORDERS REORGANIZING OFFICES: 45 
Ministries/Departments : (18) 
Budget and Management/ EO 86 
Agriculture, EO 116, 
Education, Culture and Sports, EO 117 
Health, EO 119 
Tourism, EO 120 
Social Welfare and Development, EO 123, EO 231 
Public Works and Highways, EO 124, EO 124-A 
Transportation and Communications, EO 125, EO 125-A, EO 201, 
EO 266 (third amendment) 
Labor and Employment, EO 126, EO 251 
Finance, EO 127 
National Science and Technology Authority (Now DOST), EO 128 
Agrarian Reform, EO 129, EO 129-A 
Natural Resources, EO 131, EO 131-A 
Trade and Industry, EO 133, EO 242, EO 242-A 
Energy (Now Office of Enfergy Affairs), EO 193 
National Economic and Development Authority, EO 230 
Foreign Affairs, EO 239 
Local Government, EO 26'2 
Constitutional Commissions: (3) 
Civil Service Commission, EOs 67, 667-A and 181 
Commission on Audit; EO 19 
Commission on Elections, EO 57 
Public Enterprises: (4) 
Philippine National Bank, EO 80 
Development Bank of the Philippines, EO 81 
Philippine Coconut Authority, EO 146 
Philippine National Oil Company, EO 171 
Other Offices/Agencies: (18) 
Office of the President, EO 3 
National Labor Relations Commission, EO 47 
National Security Council, EO 115 
National Census and Statistics Office, EO 121 
Metropolitan Manila Flood Control and Drainage Council, 
EO 124-B 
Presidential Management Staff, EO 130, EO 241 
Population Commission, EO 160 
National Council for the Welfare of the Disabled Persons, 
EO 232 
Council for the Welfare of Children, EO 233 
National Nutrition Council, EO 234 
Cabinet Secretariat, EO 237 
Office of the Vice-President, EO 240 
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Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, EO 247 
Office of the Press Secretary, EO 297 
Office of the Solicitor General, EO 300 
Regional Development Councils, EO 308 
Peace and Order Council, EO 309, EO 320 
Local Development Councils, EO 319 
Two other executive orders transfer the agencies'attached to 
the Ministries of Human Settlements and Energy to the Office 
of the President. 
III. EOS ABOLISHING OFFICES: 6 
Economic Support Fund Council, EO 15 
Ministry of Human Settlements and Office of Media Affairs, 
EO 85 
Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities, EO 122 
Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission, 150-A 
Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization, 
EO 165 
General Services Administration, EO 285 
IV. AMENDMENTS/SUSPENSIONS 20 
1. EO 13: PCGG 
2. EO 67-A: CSC 
3. EO 181: CSC 
4. EO 124-A: DPWH 
5. EO 125-A: MOTC 
6. EO 129-A: DA 
7. EO 131-A: DENR REO suspension 
8. EO 163-A: CHR 
9. EO 192: DENR 
10. EO 201: Further Amending DOTC REO 
11. EO 231: DSWD 
12. EO 241: PMS 
13. EO 242: DTI 
14. EO 242-A: DTI 
15. EO 251: DOLE 
16. EO 266: DOTC (third amendment) 
17. EO 320: Peace and Order Council 
18. EO 293: OSCC 
19. EO 294: ONCC 
20. EO 295: OMA 
TOTAL REOs: 101 
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REOs ISSUED FROM JULY 22 TO JULY 26, 1987 
1. Reorganization: 15 
Metro Manila Flood Control Council, EO 124-B, July 22, 1987 
National Economic and Development Authority, EO 230, July 
22, 1987) 
National Council for the Welfare of the Disabled Persons, 
EO 232, July 22, 1987 
Council for the Welfare of Children, EO 233, July 22, 1987 
National Nutrition Council, EO 234, July 22, 1987 
Cabinet Secretariat, EO 237, July 22, 1987 
Department of Foreign Affairs, EO 239, July 24, 1987 
Office of the Vice-President, EO 240, July 24, 1987 
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, EO 247, July 
24, 1987 
Department of Local Government, EO 262, July 25, 1987 
Office of the Press Secretary, EO 297, July 25, -1987 
Office of the Solicitor General, EO 300, July 26, 1987 
Regional Development Councils, EO 308 (Official Gazette, 
November 9, 1987) 
Peace and Order Council, EO 309 (Official Gazette, November 
16, 1987) 
Local Development Councils, EO 319 (Official Gazette, March 
7, 1988) 
2. EOs Creating Offices: 11 
Corporate Affairs Group, EO 127-A, July 22, 1987 
Office of the Ombudsman, EO 243, July 24, 1987 
Office of the Special Prosecutor, EO 24'4, July 24, 1987 
National Tobacco Administration, EO 245, July 24, 1987 
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, EO 246, July 24, 
1987 
Aurora Integrated Area Development Project Office, EO 265, 
July 25, 1987 
Presidential Council for Youth Affairs, EO 274, July 25, 
1987 
Sequestered Assets Disposition Authority, EO 286, July 25, 
1987 
Kalinga Special Development Authority, EO 302, July 26, 1987 
Council of State, EO 305 
Energy Coordinating Council, EO 338 
3. Amendments: 12 
4. EOs Abolishing Offices: 2 (GSA, PBRC) 
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Appendix 2 
RATE OF INCREASE (DECREASE) OF PERSONNEL 
BEFORE AND AFTER REORGANIZATION, 1987 AND JANUARY 1989 
SECTOR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INCREASE PERCENTAGE 
BEFORE AFTER (DECREASE) 
I. ECONOMIC 
Department of Agriculture 
CO 5472 4825 -647 -11.82 
RO 22938 25081 2143 9.30 
Total 28410 29906 1496 5.27 
National Nutrition Council 
CO 100 90 -10 -10.00 
RO 40 52 12 30.00 
Total 140 142 2 1.30 
Department of Agrarian Reform 
CO 741 1177 436 58.84 
RO 8423 13370 4947 58.73 
Total 9164 14547 5383 58.74 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
CO 5868 3847 -2021 -34.40 
RO 16748 20970 4222 25.21 
Total 22616 24817 2201 9.79 
Department of Public Works and Highways 
CO 3315 2716 -599 -18.06 
RO 15850 16626 776 4.82 
Total 19165 19342 177 0.92 
Department of Tourism 
CO 894 506 -388 -43.40 
RO 231 287 56 24.24 
Total 1125 793 -332 -29.51 
Department of Trade and industry 
CO 1132 1271 139 12.28 
RO 713 1846 1133 158.90 
Total 1845 3117 1272 68.94 
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Appendix 2 (cont'd) 
SECTOR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL 
BEFORE AFTER 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
PERCENTAGE 
7. Department of Transportation and Communications 
CO 
RO 
Total 
27475 
3214 
30689 
27519 
3238 
30757 
44 
24 
68 
CO 
RO 
Total 
CO 
RO 
Total 
523 
52 
575 
II 
8. Office of Energy Affairs 
388 
388 
9. Energy Regulatory Board 
192 250 
192 250 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
1. Department of Education, Culture and Sports 
-135 
-52 
-187 
58 
58 
CO 
RO 
Total 
.2659 
356445 
359104 
2453 
389660 
392113 
2. Department of Health 
CO 
RO 
Total 
2110 
59247 
61357 
2603 
65223 
67826 
Philippine Medical Care Commission 
2235 438 
2235 438 
Department of Labor and Employment 
CO 
RO 
Totafl 
CO 
RO 
Total 
878 
1239 
2117 
956 
1490 
2446 
-206 
33215 
33009 
493 
5976 
6469 
-1797 
-1797 
78 
251 
329 
0.16 
0.75 0.22 
-25.81 
-100.00 
-32.52 
30.20 
30.20 
-7.75 
9.31 
9.19 
23.36 
10.09 
10.54 
•80.40 
•80.40 
8.88 
20.26 
15.54 
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Appendix 2 (cont'd) 
SECTOR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INCREASE PERCENTAGE 
BEFORE AFTER (DECREASE) 
A. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 
CO 429 535 106 24.71 
RO - - -
Total 429 535 106 24.71 
B. National Labor Relations Council 
CO 160 217 57 35.62 
RO 556 634 78 14.03 
Total 716 851 135 18.85 
4. Department of Social Welfare Development 
CO 473 502 29 6.13 
RO 5006 6478 1472 29.40 
Total 5479 6980 1501 27.40 
A. National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons 
CO 66 79 13 . 19.70 
RO - _ 
Total 66 79 13 19.70 
B. Council for the Welfare of Children 
CO 23 23 0 0 
RO -
Total 23 23 0 0 
C. Commission on Population 
CO 267 131 -136 -50.94 
RO 324 401 77 23.76 
Total 591 532 -59 -9.98 
5. Office of Muslim Affairs 
CO 174 201 27 15.52 
RO 713 621 -92 -12.90 
Total 887 822 -65 -7.33 
6. Office of Northern Cultural Communities 
CO 0 130 130 0 
RO 0 323 323 0 
Total 0 453 453 0 
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Appendix 2 (cont'd) 
SECTOR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL 
BEFORE AFTER 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
PERCENTAGE 
7. Office of Southern Cultural Communities 
CO 
RO 
Total 
106 
713 
819 
130 
733 
863 
8. Kalinga Special Development Authority 
CO 61 64 
RO - -
Total 61 64 
24 
20 
44 
3 
3 
22.64 
2.80 
5.37 
4.92 
4.92 
III. GENERAL GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
1. Department of Finance 
CO 
RO 
Total 
6187 
14864 
21051 
5413 
14662 
20075 
2. Department of Foreign Affairs 
1717 1741 
1717 1741 
Department of Local Government 
CO 
RO 
Total 
CO 
RO 
Total 
787 
4762 
5549 
829 
5020 
5849 
4. Office of the Vice President 
CO 
RO 
Total 
83 
83 
5. Cabinet Secretariat 
CO 29 
RO 
Total 29 
125 
125 
48 
48 
•774 
-202 
•976 
24 
24 
42 
258 
300 
42 
42 
19 
19 
•12.51 
-1.36 
-4.64 
1.40 
1.40 
5.34 
5.42 
5.41 
50.60 
50.60 
65.52 
65.52 
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SECTOR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INCREASE PERCENTAGE 
BEFORE AFTER (DECREASE) 
6. Presidential Management Staff 
CO 241 338 97 40.25 
RO - 132 132 0 
Total 241 470 229 95.02 
IV. SUPPORT SERVICES SECTOR 
1. Department of Budget and Management 
CO 1574 1368 -206 -13.09 
RO 495 547 52 10.50 
Local Budget 
Officers - 1669 
Total 2069 3584 1515 73.22 
2. Department of Science and Technology 
CO 4336 3601 -735 -16.95 
RO 1286 1167 -119 -9.25 
Total 5622 4768 -854 -15.19 
3. National Economic Development Authority 
CO 788 720' -68 -8.63 
RO 505 754 249 49.30 
Total 1293 1474 181 13.99 
4. Office of the Press Secretary 
CO 1628 1122 -506 -31.08 
RO -
Total 1628 1122 -506 -31.08 
5. National Statistical Coordination Board 
CO 103 169 66 64.08 
RO - -
Total 103 169 66 64.08 
6. National Printing Office 
CO 1533 851 -682 -44.49 
RO - -
Total 1533 851 -682 -44.49 
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SECTOR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL 
BEFORE AFTER 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
PERCENTAGE 
V. > CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICES SECTOR 
1. Commission on Audit 
CO 
RO 
Total 
1149 
14941 
16090 
6427 
8789 
15216 
2. Civil Service Commission 
CO 
RO 
Total 
660 
750 
1410 
663 
788 
1451 
3. Commission on Human Rights 
CO 258 
RO 206 
Total 464 
VI. CORPORATIONS 
1. PEFLGC a/ 127 
2. PCVC b/ 154 
3. SSS c7 3102 
GRAND TOTALS 610070 
306 
328 
634 
233 
220 
3611 
659725 
5278 
-6152 
-874 
3 
38 
41 
48 
122 
170 
106 
66 
509 
49655 
459.36 
-41.18 
-5.43 
.45 
5.07 
2.91 
18.60 
59.22 
36.64 
83.46 
42.86 
16.40 
8.14 
a/ 
I 
W 
I 
C/ 
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation. t 
Philippine Convention and Visitors Corporation. 
Social Security System. 
Source: Department of Budget and Management, January 1989. 
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List of PIDS Working Papers Comprising the Study on 
"An Assessment of the Performance of the Aquino Government 
in Selected Policy Areas, 1986-1988" 
WP No. 90-02 An Assessment" of the Performance ofr the Aquino 
Government in Selected Policy Areas, 1986-1988: An 
Overview and Summary 
by Erlinda M. Medalla 
WP No. 90-03 An Assessment of Public Administration in 
the Philippines, 1986-1988 
by Ledivina V. Carifio 
WP No. 90-04 An Assessment of the External Dent Management in 
tne Philippines, 1986-1988 
by Josef T. Yap 
WP No. 90-05 An Assessment of Policies Affecting the Financial 
Sector, 1986-1988 
by Mario B. Lamberte and Julius p. Relampagos 
WP No. 90*06 An Assessment of Fiscal Policy in tne Philippines, 
1986-1988 
by Rosano G. Manasan 
WP No. 90-07 An Assessment of Trade and industrial Policy, 
1986-1988 
by Erlinda M. Medalla 
WP No. 90-08 A Review of Philippine Natural Resource and 
Environmental Management, 1986-1988 
by Marian S. delos Angeles and Noela C. Lasmarias 
WP No* 90-09 An Assessment of Labor and Employment Policies in 
the Philippines, 1986-1988 
by Edna A. Reyes and Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez 
WP No. 90-10 An Assessment of Population, Health and Education 
Policies in the Philippines, 1986-1988 
by Alejandro N. Herrin 
HP No. 90-11 A Review of the 1986 Reform of the Individual 
Income Tax 
by Rosario G. Manasan 
WP No. 90-12 An Analysis of the Value Added Tax in the 
Philippines 
by Rosario G. Manasan 
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